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In Africa the global food crisis threatens the livelihoods of millions of people who because of high rates 
of poverty, hunger, malnutrition, and food dependency are already exceptionally vulnerable. In better 
circumstances, Africa’s agricultural sector would respond to rising prices by increasing food supply. But 
such a response is impossible without significant new policy actions on both the production and 
marketing of African agriculture. This paper assesses the likely impacts of two strategic policy options: 
doubling African staples production, and improving “market access” through regional integration and 
lowering transaction costs. Using an economywide multimarket model for 17 African economies and 
econometrically estimated parameters describing the relationships between growth and poverty and 
between public spending and growth, we assess the impacts of these two strategic options on Africa’s 
food markets and its broader economic development.  
Doubling staples production significantly increases food security, reduces consumer food prices 
by roughly 25 percent, reduces producer prices by 10 percent (thus raising farm revenue), accelerates 
agricultural growth rates, facilitates broader economic growth through new agroprocessing and export 
opportunities, and lifts more than 100 million Africans out of poverty. Key policy actions are needed to 
move from this strategic vision to implementation. The first set of actions requires investing $38 billion 
from 2009 to 2013, or $7.5 billion per year, in a well-designed package of modern agricultural inputs and 
provisions. The second requires improving and extending transport infrastructure, especially major 
transport corridors and rural feeder roads. The third requires reducing tra*de barriers, which still remain 
much higher in agriculture than in other sectors. All of these actions are technically and financially 
feasible, but their timely implementation requires urgent initiatives by both national and international 
policymakers. 
Keywords: food prices, Africa, green revolution, staples, agricultural productivity, market 




1.  INTRODUCTION 
The All Important Price of Food 
In Africa a typical family spends between 50 and 70 percent of its budget on staple foods. Surges in the 
price of food in this region can therefore make the difference between life and death, between health and 
sickness, between peace and violence, between progress and poverty. Since 2003 world maize and wheat 
prices have more than doubled. The price of rice has jumped to unprecedented levels, doubling in the first 
four months of 2008 (von Braun et al. 2008). Although food prices have come down somewhat at the 
global level, they remain very high in many countries, particularly in Africa. A recent World Bank study 
suggests that this surge in prices could plunge 105 million more people worldwide—many of them 
Africans—into poverty (Ivanic and Martin 2008). As local markets in Africa begin to feel the effects of 
international price surges (see Box 1, Panel D), food riots and protests in several African countries are 
becoming commonplace, suggesting that many Africans are already suffering. Other impacts—such as the 
effects of food-induced inflation and deteriorating trade deficits—on economic growth, as well as the 
impact of childhood malnutrition on children’s health and education, will be felt only in the years to 
come. Several studies have also suggested that, unlike the 1974 food crisis, the current crisis may be 
characterized by higher real food prices for many years to come (OECD/FAO 2007; USDA 2008; von 
Braun 2008). 
In better circumstances, rising food prices should ideally induce African farmers to produce more, 
thus helping to solve the food crisis. But two decades of declining international food prices between 1980 
and 2000 have been accompanied by the neglect of African agriculture among African policymakers and 
development partners. For example, foreign assistance for agricultural development in Africa declined by 
around two-thirds in absolute terms in that period (Bezemer and Headey, 2008). Similarly, African 
governments reduced their share of budgetary allocations for agriculture from an already low level of 5 to 
10 percent in the 1980s to an extremely low level of 3 to 5 percent in the 1990s (Fan and Rao, 2004). This 
means that during the 1980s and 1990s many African governments have spent less than $20 annually per 
farmer on agricultural development, rarely enough to mitigate the taxes on small farmers directly and 
indirectly imposed by those same governments (Bezemer and Headey 2008; Schiff and Valdes 1992).  
With such meager support it is hardly surprising that African farmers have experienced stagnating 
yields and economic marginalization (Box 1, Panel A). No less surprising are the broader impacts of this 
stark neglect of African agriculture. A third of Africans suffer from malnutrition, 43 million from chronic 
hunger. Countries with significant amounts of fertile land are increasingly vulnerable to declining soil 
quality and climate change. Economies with a comparative advantage in agriculture have become 
increasingly dependent on cereal imports and food aid (Box 1, Panel B). And now the neglect of African 
agriculture is about to prove still more costly, as the ability of the continent’s smallholders to respond 
adequately to rising food prices is severely limited by underinvestment, poor infrastructure, rising energy 
and fertilizer prices, and persistent barriers to regional and international trade. 
In the face of surging food prices, the urgency of dealing with the crisis will require some 
immediate steps by African governments and donors, including expanding emergency responses and 
humanitarian assistance to the food insecure, undertaking fast-impact food production programs in key 
areas, and scaling up investments for sustained agriculture growth, among others (see von Braun et al. 
2008 for more details). The focus on revitalizing the agricultural sector is especially critical for several 
reasons. In addition to its immediate impact on food security, agriculture is still the largest source of 
employment for Africans, and it remains a lead sector of comparative advantage (Diao et al. 2007; Diao 
and Dorosh 2007). Moreover, agricultural productivity growth has repeatedly been shown to be the 
primary driver of global poverty reduction (Christiaensen, Demery, and Kühl 2006; Thirtle, Lin, and 
Piesse 2003; Byerlee, Diao, and Jackson 2005; Bezemer and Headey 2008), both through its direct effects 
on farmers’ incomes, as well as its indirect effects through the reduction of food prices. The sector also 
has tremendous growth potential when the right policies are in place. In the early 1960s rising poverty, 
increasing dependence on food aid, and severe population pressures characterized Southern Asia, not  
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Africa. But by 1988 India alone had managed to triple its production of cereals from 50 to 150 million 
metric tons through the combination of Green Revolution technologies (seeds, fertilizer, and irrigation) 
and pro-agricultural policies. In some parts of Asia, cereal yields doubled in the space of just a few years. 
In China, rapid agricultural growth from 1978 to 1984 led to a doubling of rural income and accounted for 
the largest single instance of poverty reduction in human history (Ravallion, Chen, and Sangraula 2007; 
Gulati and Fan 2008). Faster agricultural growth has also put countries on the path of a much broader 
transformation process: rising farm incomes raise demand for industrial goods, lowered food prices curb 
inflation, and induced nonfarm growth increases the demand for unskilled workers. Rising on-farm 
productivity also encourages broad entrepreneurial activities through diversification into new products, 
the growth of rural service sectors, the birth of agroprocessing industries, and the exploration of new 
export markets (World Bank 2008). 
But achieving a fundamental and sustainable transformation of African agriculture requires a new 
vision, as well as renewed efforts of both national and international policymakers. This new vision must 
deal with the fundamental causes of low productivity and lack of competitiveness in African agriculture 
and, ultimately, the resilience and ability of African economies to respond to international price shocks 
and emerging threats such as climate change. Such a vision must address four objectives for Africa. First, 
it must use Africa’s short-run supply potential to help address the continent’s most immediate problem—
food shortages and food price inflation. Second, it must directly address Africa’s short- and medium-term 
development challenges: poverty, hunger, and malnutrition. Third, it must put Africa on an overall 
economic development and sustainable development path. And finally, this vision must be centered 
around a regionwide perspective to take advantage of scale economies and multicountry growth linkages 
from greater market integration and technology spillovers. Sustaining economic progress well into the 
future will require African countries to undergo the similar economic transformation and modernization 
witnessed on other continents.  
In this paper we propose that a staples-led growth strategy—a strategy centered on rapid growth 
in staples production in conjunction with improved regional economic integration—can deliver those 
outcomes with feasible policy actions (Section 2). We test this hypothesis using an economywide 
multimarket model (described in Section 3), as well as some simple simulations based on econometrically 
derived estimates of the linkages between agricultural growth, poverty, and public investment. The merit 
of this approach is that we can rigorously estimate the broader economic impacts that this strategy would 
have on African development (Section 4). With equal rigor we can also inform the question of what such 
a strategy might cost in terms of public investment, as well as the broader issue of what complementary 






Box 1. Africa’s vulnerability to rising food prices 
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2.  DOUBLING AFRICAN FOOD PRODUCTION:  
A BROAD-BASED GROWTH STRATEGY 
Secure access to a sufficient quantity of nutritious food is a fundamental human right, but recent rising 
food prices are increasingly threatening that right, especially in Africa. The immediate goal of a 
contemporary agricultural development strategy for Africa must therefore put the highest priority on the 
production of food, especially staples. But putting staples at the top of the agenda not only addresses 
short-term problems; it also promotes broader economic progress and poverty reduction.  
Targeting staples is pro-poor in other important dimensions as well. African staples are largely 
grown by Africa’s smallholders, who make up 70 percent of the continent’s farmers (Johnson, Hazell, and 
Gulati 2003), so growth in staples production will typically be highly pro-poor. A wide range of research 
has also demonstrated the importance of food staples—in both the crops and livestock sectors—in driving 
growth and contributing to a dynamic structural transformation of rural economies (Byerlee, Diao, and 
Jackson 2005; Bezemer and Headey 2008; Hazell and Diao 2005; World Bank 2008). Acceleration in 
staples production has also been found to produce second- and third-round effects on the broader 
economy by reducing food prices for urban consumers, curbing overall inflation, and releasing scarce 
foreign exchange for the importation of goods that are typically unsuited to production within Africa 
(Diao et al. 2007). And in the longer run the productivity growth in African staples agriculture will 
facilitate a more fundamental transformation in the broader economy through new opportunities for 
industry (e.g., agroprocessing), growth opportunities for rural nonfarm activities (Haggblade, Hazell, and 
Reardon 2007), and increased regional and international trade, as well as new employment options 
through expanded migration. 
A staples-led growth strategy also makes use of Africa’s comparative advantage. Africa’s natural 
agricultural resource base has considerable potential for rapid productivity growth in staples. A 
comprehensive global assessment of the world’s agricultural ecology by Fischer et al. (2002) shows that 
Africa has 420 million hectares of land with high cultivation potential (moderate or slight constraints for 
agricultural production), yet in 2003 only 180 million hectares (of all land types) were under cultivation. 
High-yielding varieties of seed can work in Africa, and a science-based revolution of African agriculture 
is feasible in a technical sense (Johnson, Hazell, and Gulati 2003; Evenson 2003; Evenson and Rosegrant 
2003; Evenson and Gollin 2005). Fertilizer consumption, although exceptionally low in Africa, can 
quickly be scaled up under the right conditions. In Kenya, Malawi, and Uganda, for example, the implicit 
costs that smallholders face in obtaining fertilizers have been greatly reduced by multipartner efforts to 
tailor the fertilizer market to the needs of smallholders and small-scale agro-dealers (World Bank 2008, 
153). In terms of irrigation, available data suggest that most of mainland Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding 
South Africa) uses less than 20 percent of its irrigation potential, meaning that Africa has considerable 
scope to reduce its dependency on volatile rainfall patterns (FAO 1997). Although expanding irrigation is 
desirable, the unique challenges to developing irrigation in Africa must be carefully weighed. Low and 
scattered population densities may require smaller irrigation schemes, but on the other hand larger 
irrigation schemes can take advantage of scale economies and thus result in a higher rate of return to 
investment (see Innocencio et al. 2007 for more details on the returns and challenges to irrigation 
investments in Africa). And whilst the modernization of African agriculture still requires careful 
environmental management, that modernization can also help protect Africa’s natural resources through 
restoring soil nutrients via increased fertilizer usage. 
The broader economic environment for African agriculture is also improving. African countries 
have experienced rapid improvements in general governance scores and in macroeconomic stability.
1 
Moreover, in 2002 African governments signed onto the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development 
Programme (CAADP) of the African Union and New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), 
                                                      
1 Twenty-seven of Africa’s 40 countries registered improvements in widely used governance scores from 1996 to 2006 
(WDI 2008).
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which shows that accelerating agricultural development on the continent has become a common goal for 
most African countries. In 2003, the heads of African countries endorsed the targets of 6 percent annual 
agricultural growth and 10 percent budget allocation to agriculture under the CAADP framework. These 
multicountry development strategies also emphasize the growing recognition that greater cross-country 
cooperation and economic integration will allow African countries to make better use of scale economies, 
expand regional markets, and expand opportunities for trade through differences in comparative 
advantage. In the set of countries we study, serious efforts to implement CAADP have already been set in 
motion.  
In summary, the rationale for targeting the growth of staples production in Africa is sound. It is 
pro-poor, pro-growth, and consistent with Africa’s comparative advantage, but it is also a strategy made 
additionally feasible by the recent commitments of African governments toward scaling up their 
investments in agriculture via a stronger multicountry regional perspective. That said, policymakers still 
need hard numbers on the impacts that this strategy could be expected to have on Africa’s response to the 
current food crisis, as well as its longer-run economic development. In the next section we outline a 




To assess the likely economywide impact of a staples-led growth strategy in Africa we develop an 
economywide multimarket (EMM) model that explicitly measures the potential effects of rapid increases 
in productivity (essentially doubling production) on the supply, demand, and prices of food staples 
between 2009 and 2013. The modeling exercise is augmented with additional analysis to determine the 
potential impact of such a strategy on poverty and the required level of public-sector investments and 
complementary policy actions. In this section, we briefly discuss the key features of the model and 
simulation exercises. 
The Economywide Multimarket Model 
The EMM model is based on neoclassical microeconomic theory and falls short of the more standard 
general equilibrium model. IFPRI has used the EMM model for a number of country- and regional-level 
studies that assess options for agricultural growth and agricultural growth’s economywide impact on 
poverty in Africa (see, for example, Diao and Nin Pratt 2007; Omamo et al. 2007). In general, a 
multimarket model is a partial equilibrium model that typically focuses on a single sector in an economy, 
such as agriculture. Although the EMM model developed for this study focuses primarily on agriculture, 
other important economic activities (i.e., industry and services) are also included as two aggregated 
sectors. Thus, the model partially captures general equilibrium linkages within the economy and across 
key sectors within agriculture. The agriculture sector is disaggregated into a number of key economic 
activities, either as individual subsectors or as a group of commodities. 
The EMM model includes 17 Sub-Saharan African countries (Angola, Cameroon, Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia). These countries have explicitly acknowledged the importance of 
agriculture in their economies by agreeing to allocate more public resources and undertake policy reforms 
to achieve higher growth rates in yields as modeled here. Moreover, the list includes some of the 
continent’s most populous and most important economies, such as Nigeria and Ethiopia. Although 
productivity growth is assumed to take place in the staples sectors of these 17 economies only, its effects 
are measured on all other countries in the region. Therefore, the entire Sub-Saharan African continent 
(excluding South Africa) is included in the study. There are 15 agricultural commodities (crops and 
livestock) and two aggregate nonagricultural activities included in the model. The agricultural 
commodities are maize, rice, sorghum, millet, wheat, barley, other cereals, cassava, yams, other roots, oil 
crops, pulses, other crops, poultry, and other livestock, and the nonagricultural sectors are industry and 
services.  
A more detailed overview of the model structure can be found in Appendix A, which also 
discusses the limitations of the EMM model as they relate to the model’s treatment of factor inputs and 
distributional impacts. Of additional concern is that an EMM simulation is generally more sensitive than a 
general equilibrium model to the assumptions embedded in the model, especially the choice of both 
demand and supply elasticities. Appendix A therefore also provides some sensitivity tests based on 
variations of the model’s core assumptions. The main finding is that the only variation capable of yielding 
very different results is the switch from positive to negative income elasticities for commodities such as 
poultry and rice, although in this case we believe our baseline assumptions are much more realistic than 
the alternative. Nevertheless, these and other caveats cannot be dismissed altogether. Ultimately, the 
adoption of the EMM model still needs to be couched in terms of the inevitable tradeoff between existing 
data constraints and the desire to obtain rigorous answers to the types of questions that we wish to 




In this study we conduct two simulations. In the first we consider only broader economic effects of a 
staples-led acceleration in productivity, together with modest land expansion. The total increase in yield 
by crop and country is calculated based on estimated yield potential and the gap between current actual 
yields and maximum yields achieved elsewhere in the region (in most cases in South Africa).
2 In effect, 
we assume that Africa’s staples production systems can catch up to their own regional productivity 
frontiers (or meta-frontiers) rather than the more ambitious assumption that they catch up to a global 
productivity frontier. This regional meta-frontier can be thought of as representing the maximum 
attainable productivity levels or yield for each individual staple crop in the region. The average annual 
growth rate of staples production is calculated such that the countries can converge to the meta-frontier 
over the next five years (2009–2013), assuming a greater number of farmers will be able to adopt more 
modern inputs (e.g., seeds and fertilizer) and best farming practices to raise yields. The land expansion is 
based on the historical trend of recent years and varies across countries and crops. With accelerated 
growth in productivity or yields among the 17 African countries, together with modest increases in crop 
areas, Africa-wide grain production is expected to be doubled and production of root crops, other staple 
crops, and livestock will significantly increase by 40 to 70 percent in the next five years. Although the 
population growth rate implicitly affects the rate of land expansion, it is not included in the model, except 
insofar as we report per capita income and consumption. It is also important to point out that because 
supply responses and price changes are endogenous, the actual growth rates in both yield and area 
expansion are themselves endogenous results of the model, and therefore different from the exogenous 
growth rates assumed in the yield and area functions.  
In the second scenario we simulate the combination of two different scenarios imposed on the 
model. In addition to the staples productivity growth scenario, we try to capture the effect of a shift to 
more integrated regional markets. Specifically, we assume that all tariff or nontariff barriers to trade are 
removed through, for example, greatly improved transportation networks and deregulated trade and 
transport policies, which results in liberalized markets and trade between countries (see Section 4 for 
more discussion). This implies that supply now meets demand at the continental level and the net exports 
or imports as trade with the rest of the world are defined at the regional level rather than at the country 
level. “Improved market access” is also captured within the domestic market of each country by imposing 
a reduction in the domestic marketing margins between producer and consumer prices. The margin or gap 
between producer and consumer prices is exogenously lowered gradually over the five-year period in our 
study, from 40 to around 20 percent by 2013 with a 15 percent annual reduction rate. Such “domestic 
market improvement” also implies that there will be differences between the degree to which consumer 
and producer prices fall in response to increased staples supply, which we will discuss later. 
                                                      
2 While it is hardly fair to compare much of Africa’s smallholder agriculture with the performance of South Africa’s larger 
commercial agricultural sector, the calculated yield gaps turn out to be quite reasonable.  Maximum attainable grain yields for 
rain-fed maize, rice, and wheat for Africa were estimated by Fischer et al. (2002) to have the potential to increase by threefold to 
sixfold in the short run if farmers were able to move from low to intermediate input use, and from low to high input use, 
respectively. The increase in our sample is much more conservative, barely a twofold increase.  This is more reasonable 
considering the current poor state of infrastructure, modern input use, research, and extension systems in most countries in the 
region.        
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4.  ASSESSING THE IMPACTS OF STAPLES-LED GROWTH IN AFRICA 
To assess the broad economic welfare impacts of a staples-led growth strategy in Africa, we primarily 
focus attention on measuring its effects on food security overall, possible changes in food prices, farmer 
revenues, overall agriculture growth, and poverty reduction. Although we discuss the results mostly at the 
Africa-wide level, model results are actually obtained at the country level. 
Impact on Region’s Food Security 
Figure 1 presents a projection of the change in imports as a percentage of total demand for rice, wheat, 
and poultry over the period 2008 to 2013. Many African countries depend greatly on imports to meet 
domestic demand for these three commodities. For example, 60 percent of rice and 90 percent of poultry 
meat consumed by Ghanaians in domestic markets has been imported from Thailand, China, Vietnam, 
and Brazil. Therefore, growth in per capita incomes and urbanization is expected to continue to put a huge 
pressure on import bills in many African countries. Although doubling domestic rice and wheat 
production may partially allow some degree of import substitutions for these commodities, the model 
results suggest that Africa as a whole will not be able to become self-sufficient in these two cereals. 
African cereal imports are therefore not expected to decline much in absolute terms. However, imports as 
a percentage of domestic demand could fall. For example, the share of imports in Africa’s domestic 
demand for rice declines to 12 percent by 2013 from 32 percent currently. Hence a staples-led growth 
strategy will certainly relieve much of the pressure currently being placed on Africa’s cereal import bill. 
This is even considering the high growth rates in consumption over time as incomes rise. By 2013, Africa 
as a whole will be consuming 50 percent more rice and wheat and 60 percent more poultry as incomes 
rise for the majority of the rural and urban population due to the initial acceleration in agricultural growth. 


















































Source: The African EMM model simulation results. 
Among local staples, maize, sorghum, millet, cassava, yam, and other root crops are the most 
important starchy foods in the diets of most Africans, particularly in rural areas. Figure 2 presents the 
balance between supply and demand of these major staple crops in 2008 and 2013. The rapid growth in 
these staple crops, which are mainly grown by small (and often subsistent) farmers, will allow many poor 
rural households to switch from being net buyers to net sellers of these commodities, thus significantly 
improving food security in rural Africa. Moreover, increased supply will lower food prices in domestic 
markets, enabling urban consumers to consume more without increasing their total expenditure on food.  
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Source: The African EMM model simulation results. 
Whilst food security is expected to improve significantly, growth in staples production can also 
serve as an engine for income growth for the majority of smallholder African farmers. To realize that 
objective, farmers need to have adequate access to markets. It is therefore necessary to examine the broad 
market opportunities for food staples in Africa, an issue that is beyond the immediate food security 
objective. Although a majority of households (particularly in rural areas) consume much more of the 
traditional staple crops (maize, sorghum, millet, and root crops) than rice and wheat, the income elasticity 
of consumer demand for those staples is low; that is, many consumers prefer to spend more of their rising 
incomes on rice and wheat rather than on the traditional staples. Because of this, the growth in food 
demand for traditional staples will lag behind the growth in supply of these commodities following any 
rapid increase in their yields. Taking into account both population and income growth to estimate future 
demand, the model projects only a 20 to 25 percent increase in food consumption of the traditional staples 
over the next five years compared with a 50 percent increase for rice and wheat.  
Market opportunities for traditional staples also exist for other than human consumption. Maize 
and other coarse grains, as well as some root crops such as cassava, are also consumed by livestock as 
feed. Currently, feed demand for such crops is extremely low in Africa as traditional technology 
dominates livestock production in the region. Under improved livestock production technologies, coupled 
with a growing demand for livestock products (particularly in urban areas and as incomes rise), the 
demand for feed will quickly rise. The model considers this potential by explicitly considering a 
significant increase in feed demand when livestock production grows rapidly, particularly poultry. It is 
reasonable to assume that the demand for poultry will grow rapidly in Africa, especially as urbanization 
proceeds and per capita incomes rise.
3 Presently, any demand growth is being met mostly through 
increased imports. If domestic poultry production grows rapidly to meet this demand, the model projects 
that feed demand for maize, for example, could easily grow by as much as 180 percent by 2013. 
Meanwhile, the feed-to-food ratio for maize will rise to 5 percent from the current low level of 2 percent. 
Even with such rapid growth, the model may be underestimating the growth in feed demand given that 
little modern technology is being used by most farmers for poultry and livestock production in Africa, and 
even if modern technologies are widely adopted, the potential for import substitution will remain high for 
poultry.  
                                                      
3 Calculated from FAO data, per capita meat consumption grew by 8 percent in China annually between 1978 and 1994 
when the country started its rapid economic growth and urbanization.   
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Experience from Thailand indicates how huge the market opportunities for maize could be if the 
poultry sector is developed. Thailand has become a very large poultry exporter since the late 1980s. The 
rapid growth in exports has created a big market for maize consumption in the country. Before that, feed 
demand accounted for only a small portion of maize production (3–7 percent), as in Africa today. With 
the development of the poultry industry, feed demand in Thailand now accounts for 70 to 80 percent of 
maize production (a tenfold increase over two decades). It is therefore reasonable to believe that 
development of the poultry sector in Africa offers an opportunity for maize production to grow, making it 
not only an important staple commodity for human consumption but an important cash crop for many of 
the continent’s smallholder farmers. 
Staple crops also serve as important inputs in agroprocessing industries. The potential market 
opportunities in this sector are especially large if growth rates are accelerated in both agriculture and 
nonagriculture. The model also assumes a doubling of these types of input demand for staples over the 
next five years. This is a very conservative assumption given the small base from which these sectors will 
expand.  
By taking into account all these important sources of potential demand for staples—food, feed, 
and agroprocessing industries—75 percent of the increased supply in staples can be met by domestic and 
regional demand, while 25 percent will need to be exported outside the continent (see the case of maize in 
Figure 3). 






















Source: The African EMM model simulation results.  
The good news is that promising export opportunities in global markets do exist for many staple 
crops. We take cassava as an example, and again refer to Thailand’s experience. Although more than 60 
percent of world cassava is produced by African farmers, and although Thailand’s share is less than 10 
percent, it exports 80 percent of its production, which accounts for 70 to 80 percent of world cassava 
trade, mostly for the feed and starch industry. Cassava chips and flours are broadly used for both feed and 
agroprocessing sectors in many countries. World cassava exports currently amount to 22 million metric 
tons. In contrast, Africa produces about 100 million metric tons in total, and then mainly for domestic 
food consumption. It is therefore reasonable to expect that with the adoption of high-yield varieties, cost-
effective processing technologies, and improved market access conditions, African cassava could 
successfully be exported to the rest of the world. Under such a scenario, large producers such as Nigeria 
could become dominant cassava exporters.  
What Will Happen to Food Prices? 
Although increased food production would appear to benefit both farmers and consumers, that is not 
necessarily always the case. Indeed, increased supply can cause rapid declines in food prices, which may  
11 
 
even result in net revenue losses for farmers, thereby discouraging production. However, when production 
growth is driven by productivity and the necessary policies to stabilize prices are in place so that market 
speculation is minimal, farmers should in general benefit from productivity growth even with lowered 
prices. A more integrated African market also helps stabilize prices, as surpluses from one country can 
find demand in other countries. For this reason we distinguish between a scenario with productivity 
increases only under current market conditions and one with improved and more integrated market access 
conditions. For the latter, we consider two specific assumptions: (1) pervasive reductions in trade barriers 
across Africa such that agricultural goods can move freely between countries; and (2) lowering price 
margins in domestic markets such that the gap between producer and consumer prices falls from around 
40 percent of producer prices to around 20 percent. As shown in Figure 4, the effects of improving market 
access are that (a) producer prices fall by a mere 10 percent rather than the 35 to 40 percent if market 
conditions stayed the same (Panel A); and (b) consumer prices fall more than producer prices, by around 
25 percent (Panel B).  







































































































Source: The African EMM model simulation results.  
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What Will Happen to Farmer Revenue? 
Under the improved market access scenario, the modest decline in producer prices means that farmers 
will be able to have strong incentives to maintain high levels of production, given that farmers’ revenue is 
determined by both the amount they produce and the prices they receive.
4 Not surprisingly then, a more 
integrated African market for staples together with producivity increases significantly raises farm 
revenues in comparison with productivity increases only. Figure 5 presents total farmer revenue from 
each staple commodity. The difference between the two scenarios is the combination of a smaller decline 
of producer prices and the faster growth in supply. The faster growth in supply with better integrated 
markets occurs as a result of stronger incentives for farmers to maintain high production growth rates as 
they face a higher price regime with greater market opportunities. The difference in farmer revenue 
coming from major staple products between the two scenarios is about $40 billion, or a 40 percent 
increase in five years. Increases in cassava and maize revenue from a more integrated regional model is 
especially significant, $6.6 and $7.5 billion in total in the five years, indicating the vital contribution of 
improved market conditions (e.g., through better market integration) for these two important staple 
commodities.  












































Source: The African EMM model simulation results. 
What Will Happen to Overall Agricultural Growth and Economic Growth? 
Staple crops and livestock are the most important agricultural activities across most African countries. As 
shown in Figure 6, when staples grow rapidly, total agricultural growth reaches more than 10 percent 
annually for most countries. The growth rate for the 17 countries as a group reaches 12.5 percent, and it is 
11.3 percent for all of Sub-Saharan Africa. Such growth is achieved partly due to a more integrated 
Africa-wide market. Without greater market integration, the agricultural growth rate for Africa as a whole 
would be lower, at about 9.5 percent. In other words, improved market integration allows African 
agriculture to grow by two percentage points more as productivity rises, compared with the scenario when 
productivity rises alone under current market conditions. Among individual countries, especially for those 
                                                      
4 As the EMM model does not explicitly model the use of inputs and hence the production costs, the farmers’ revenue 
reported here does not equal the net profit going to farmers’ family labor and land.  
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with large surpluses in domestic markets, the benefit in growth from regional market integration is even 
greater. Nigeria, for example, would enjoy a 15 percent annual agricultural growth rate if it were able to 
export its commodity surpluses to neighboring countries. In contrast, it would grow only at 12 percent 
without such export opportunities.  
Figure 6 also displays the contributions of accelerated productivity growth together with more 
integrated regional markets within each agricultural subsector to overall agricultural growth. In general, 
the grain sector contributes the most to overall agricultural growth. However, for some countries, growth 
in root crops contributes the most. Growth in livestock is also important among some countries, 
particularly Mali, Kenya, and Ethiopia. The diversity in growth rates within and between different 
agricultural sectors and across African countries further validates the urgent need for promoting a more 
integrated African market as it will generate broader benefits from growth through realization of 
comparative advantage. 
Because of the importance of agriculture in the economy for most African countries, accelerating 
staples growth stimulates the overall economic growth. Annual growth rate in gross domestic product 
(GDP) for the 17 countries as a whole rises to 7.1 percent, and will further increase to 7.7 percent with 
more integrated regional markets. Such economywide growth is an outcome of agricultural growth as a 
direct contribution, but it is also an outcome of the linkage effects between the agricultural sector and 
nonagricultural sectors and between increased rural income and hence demand and production growth 
induced by such demand.  
Figure 6. Agricultural annual growth and subsector contribution, 2009–2013 
 
Source: The African EMM model simulation results.  
Notes: RWAF refers to other West African countries, REAF refers to other East African countries, and RSAF refers to other 
Southern African countries, where “other” refers to countries not shown and therefore experiencing the food productivity 
increases simulated in the model.  
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What Will Happen to Poverty Reduction? 
Many studies in literature have shown that agricultural growth in Africa, particularly growth led by staple 
crops and livestock, is more pro-poor than growth led by the nonagricultural sector (Diao et al. 2007; 
Christiaensen, Demery, and Kühl 2006; also see Bezemer and Headey 2008 for a review). There are 
several good reasons for this. First, growth in staples production is often broad-based as staples are 
typically grown by a majority of smallholder farmers. Poor farmers directly benefit from increasing their 
own food consumption, their land and labor productivity, and ultimately, their incomes. Second, the 
growth in staples production further benefits the poor through its effect on food prices. The poor spend 
most of their income on food, and lower food prices allow them to consume more without increasing 
spending. Finally, staples growth also has strong multiplier effects on other sectors through production 
and consumption linkages, which stimulate additional growth in nonstaples agricultural as well as in 
nonagricultural sectors, such as manufacturing, construction, and various services (Delgado, Hopkins, and 
Kelly 1998).  
Taking into account these direct and indirect effects of staples growth, Figure 7 predicts the 
potential poverty reduction effect of the staples-led growth strategy considered here. Poverty is measured 
as the headcount of poor people in Africa earning less than $1 per day for the most recent year for which 
data are available. The link between the projected agricultural growth rates from the modeling results with 
poverty reduction is calculated using the so called growth–to–poverty reduction elasticity. This elasticity 
has been estimated or measured in the economics literature for a number of different countries (see, for 
example, Fan et al. 2008 for a review of different elasticity measurements). We adopt these elasticities in 
the current study. 
 





















Source: The African EMM model simulation results. 
Note: “Rest of” refers to countries experiencing food productivity increases simulated in the model as well as to other countries 
in each subregion of Africa. 
In total, we find that accelerated staples growth, together with more integrated African markets, 
has the potential to lift 107 million Africans out of poverty by 2013 (Figure 7). If market integration is not 
achieved, the degree of poverty reduction will be less, at around 98 million. Therefore, market integration 
alone contributes to the lifting of almost 10 million Africans out of poverty. Unsurprisingly, given their  
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exceptionally large size or relatively low incomes, the greatest reductions in poverty will take place in 
Nigeria (26.3 million), Ethiopia (15.5 million), Kenya (6.1 million), Ghana (3.6 million), Mozambique 
(4.8 million), and Malawi (3.4 million). However, other countries are also projected to experience poverty 
reductions that are significant relative to their populations (Figure 7). Moreover, the poverty rate is 
estimated to diminish by 18.7 percentage points Africa-wide, from 50.2 percent in 2008 to 31.5 percent in 
2013. 
Summary of the Modeling Results 
The EMM model analysis for African economies has successfully demonstrated that accelerating staples 
productivity—in conjunction with substantial improvements in regional integration—has the potential to 
generate a range of positive outcomes that address both Africa’s short-run food security issues and the 
region’s longer-run development constraints. Food prices would decline by around 10 percent for 
producers and by 20 to 30 percent for consumers. Meanwhile, food availability increases rapidly as many 
countries move from food deficits to food surpluses. This in turn opens up new avenues for net food 
demand for staples from increased regional and international trade, and in the process, creates additional 
investment opportunities for the agroprocessing and livestock private-sector industries. Finally, the 
strategy turns out to be inherently pro-poor, yielding increased revenues for farmers, most of whom are 
smallholders, and significant food price declines for both rural and urban poor consumers. Accompanied 
by greater market integration, the rapid acceleration of productivity in the staples sector has the potential 
to lift more than 100 million Africans out of poverty.  
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5.  MOVING FROM STRATEGY TO ACTION 
As shown in the preceding section the estimated benefits of a staples-led growth strategy in Africa are 
large, especially when accompanied by increased market access through improved infrastructure and 
regional trade integration. However, to realize such benefits the countries of Africa need to take some 
signfiicant policy actions. In this section we discuss those appropriate policy actions partly based on 
existing literature and partly our own analysis. 
Accelerating Public Investment and Strengthening the Public Provision of Agricultural 
Inputs  
The determinants of accelerations in agricultural production, which have occurred elsewhere in the 
developing world, especially Asia, have been amply documented (Johnson, Hazell, and Gulati 2003; 
Evenson and Gollin 2003; Rosegrant and Hazell 2000; World Bank 2008). The foundation of Asia’s 
Green Revolution, as well as agricultural modernization in Latin America, North Africa, and the Middle 
East, was the combination of increased access to a package of modern agricultural technologies—high-
yielding varieties of seed, chemical fertilizers and pesticides, and irrigation—together with broader 
improvements in infrastructure, particularly transportation and rural electrification.  
History shows that the initial impetus for modernizing smallholder agriculture needs to come 
from the public sector, which provides investments in public goods, such as infrastructure and agricultural 
R&D in which the private sector will typically struggle for active involvement, especially at early stages 
of development. Moreover, given that many African countries are small, such investment needs 
significant regional collaboration. Yet the slowdown in foreign aid to agriculture (Box 2, Panel A) has 
only very recently started to reverse, and public agricultural R&D expenditures in Africa have generally 
been very low—mostly declining in the 1980s and 1990s (Fan 2008). In recent years, however, African 
countries have revitalized their commitment to agriculture under CAADP. One component of CAADP 
was a renewed effort to increase agriculture expenditure to at least 10 percent of total government 
expenditure. As of 2005, very few countries had achieved that target (Box 2, Panel B).  
To quantify the specific amount of public spending in agriculture needed for a staples-led growth 
strategy, we use elasticities between agricultural growth and agriculture expenditure, and the growth rate 
obtained from the EMM model in Section 4.
5 That shows that the staples-led growth strategy requires 
total public spending of US$37.6 billion from 2009 to 2013, or US$7.5 billion
6 per annum, to achieve the 
required productivity growth in major food crops. If current spending patterns (US$16 billion from 2009 
to 2013) were to continue, African countries would fall far short of the target. However, if the 17 African 
countries analyzed in this study were to achieve their CAADP spending targets—that is, devoting at least 
10 percent of their government spending to agriculture—in the next five years, then they would achieve 
more than 80 percent of the public spending required for the staples-led growth strategy (see Box 1, Panel 
C, in details). 
Africa therefore urgently needs to follow in the footsteps of rapid-response countries like China 
and India, where public agricultural expenditure has been increased by as much as 30 percent in recent 
years. Such public expenditures are needed on the essential combination of modern inputs, along with 
additional expenditures on enabling investments in infrastructure, especially. Such investments also need 
to take place quickly. As Figure 8 shows, Africa is lagging behind in the use of modern agricultural 
inputs, such as irrigation, modern staple varieties, and fertilizer. 
                                                      
5 For more details, refer to Fan et al. (2008). 
6 Measured in 2008 constant U.S. dollars.  
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Box 2. Agricultural investment in Africa: Historical trends and projected requirements 


































































































































































































































































































Historically, investment in African agriculture has been very low. 
Foreign aid to African agriculture declined by about two-thirds during 
the 1990s (Panel A) before picking up in more recent years. Equally 
encouraging, a number of African countries agreed under CAADP to 
increase their own agricultural spending to 10 percent of total public 
spending. As of 2007, however, only a few countries had reached that 
target (Panel B). If such spending patterns continue, public agricultural 
expenditure in Africa—totaling $16 billion—will not be sufficient for 
achieving the accelerated staples growth, which is estimated to require 
$37.6 billion (Panel C). The good news is achieving the CAADP 10 
percent targets would provide more than 80 percent of the required 
expenditure ($32.2 billion), and the remaining investments could feasibly 
be financed from donors, foreign direct investment, NGOs, and other 
sources. 
CAADP target  
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Regarding the investments, the most controversial issues include the role of procurement 
programs and the use of subsidies in delivering agricultural inputs. Small farmers—who are especially 
prevalent in African agriculture—need access to credit on the input side as well as procurement programs 
on the output side, which can support prices for agricultural products that reflect long-term international 
market prices (von Braun et al. 2008). Some researchers and policymakers have also been highly critical 
of fertilizer subsidies and instead favor fertilizer supply responses (Gregory and Bumb 2006). The 
effectiveness of fertilizer subsidies is not a black-or-white issue, however. Although such subsidies 
played a large role in the early years of Asia’s Green Revolution, those programs have since become very 
costly and increasingly counterproductive. 
Nevertheless, in the current context—with fertilizer use exceptionally low in Africa and fertilizer 
prices extremely high due to high energy prices and transportation costs—the need for a rapid agricultural 
response cannot depend only on the supply response without significantly increasing the use of modern 
inputs to raise productivity. For this, input subsidies will be essential (von Braun et al. 2008). Subsidized 
programs for fertilizers need to proceed, but they need to build in sunset clauses and increasingly involve 
the private sector in order to facilitate a transition to market-based exits (von Braun et al. 2008). 
Moreover, sustainable increases in fertilizer use will indeed require fertilizer supply responses, partly 
through improving transport infrastructure (see following section). 
























Source: World Bank 2008. 
Notes: SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa, SAR: South Asia, EAP: East Asia Pacific, MNA: Middle East and North Africa, LAC: Latin 
America and Caribbean. No data are available on modern varieties adopted in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 
Improving Market Access  
The economic returns to improving market access have been estimated in a variety of studies, and several 
have demonstrated that transport costs are especially high in Africa relative to other regions. Using cross-
country analysis, Limao and Venables (2001), World Bank (2007), and Amjadi and Yeats (1995) find that 
the poor quality of infrastructure accounts for most of Africa’s lagging performance in trade. Limao and 
Venables (2001) estimated that a 10 percent drop in transport costs would increase African trade by 25 
percent, and that transport costs are highly sensitive to the quality of infrastructure, as measured by 
variables such as the density of the road and rail network. Several empirical studies use trucking surveys 
to reach similar conclusions. One study (Rizet and Hine 1993) estimated that prices of road transport in 
three Francophone African countries (Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, and Mali) were up to six times higher 
than in Pakistan, and about 40 percent higher than in France where labor rates are much higher.  
  19
According to another source, transport prices for most African landlocked countries range as high as 15 to 
20 percent of import costs (MacKellar, Wörgötter, and Wörz 2002), which is three to four times higher 
than those in most developed countries.  
Figure 9 summarizes some of these results for various transport corridors in Africa and other 
regions of the world. Transport prices are measured as U.S. cents per kilometer. With the exception of the 
Durban-Lusaka corridor, the remaining African corridors have much higher transport prices than other 
developed and developing regions. Indeed, Pakistan is the only other country at a stage of development 
comparable with Africa, and its transport costs are the lowest in the sample. 
Figure 9. Average transport prices are generally high in Africa’s trade corridors 
 
Sources: Various authors. 
High transport costs are especially a binding constraint for agricultural trade because of the 
physical nature of agriculture’s inputs and outputs, and because unlike manufacturing or mining, 
agricultural production does not take place in centralized locations. The modeling results from the 
previous section suggest that growth and trade accelerate much faster with increased regional integration 
in Africa. A similar study by Diao et al. (2003) also explores the implications of combining agricultural 
productivity growth with improvements in market access. Specifically, that study evaluates the real 
agricultural income gains from doubling agricultural productivity over a 12-year period, with and without 
productivity growth in the transport sector that reduces marketing costs. They find that real agricultural 
income gains are twice as high with total factor productivity (TFP) growth in transport as they are without 
such an improvement. Another study by Abdulai, Diao, and Johnson (2005) used partial and general 
equilibrium models to generate ex ante simulations of the size of regional spillovers in Africa. They 
conclude that sizable regional spillover benefits can be obtained by permitting greater cross-border 
transfers of goods, services, and labor, as well as increased adoption of improved technologies. Moreover, 
reducing trade barriers between African countries in agriculture and nonagriculture can significantly 
increase intraregional agricultural trade and raise economic growth rates. The simulations also 
demonstrate that improving transportation infrastructure generates the most encouraging results, 
increasing agricultural income by as much as 10 percent.  
Transport costs are also an important constraint on the modernization of African agriculture. For 
example, high transportation costs increase the price of fertilizer for farmers. Gregory and Bumb (2006) 
find that transport costs make up about one-third of the farm gate price of urea fertilizer in most African 
countries (Figure 10). Those transports costs are three to four times higher than they are in the United 
States and explain almost the entire difference in fertilizer costs between most African countries and the 
United States.  
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Figure 10. Transport costs make up about one-third of fertilizer price in African countries, 2005 
 
Source: Gregory and Bumb (2006). 
We also note that improved market integration and increased technology flows, especially trade 
reform, tend to spread benefits unevenly both within and between countries (in the African context, see 
Nissanke and Thorbecke 2008; for a review of the Green Revolution’s impacts on rural inequality, see 
Rosegrant and Hazell 2000). One of the lessons from the Green Revolution is the importance of proactive 
public policies in linking smallholders to both input and output markets, lest they be left behind in the 
modernization process. Likewise, trade liberalization needs to be done in conjunction with policies aimed 
at lowering domestic transaction costs so that the benefits of liberalization are shared between food 
producers and food consumers (Kherallah et al. 2002). 
Increasing market access entails improvements in both large-scale transport corridors as well as 
small rural road networks to link farmers with the major transport routes.  
Investing in Transport Corridors 
Major transport corridors in Africa link major cities and markets across countries, and link inland areas 
with the coast to provide access to international markets. These corridors open up markets and facilitate 
trade, spread information and technology, and can certainly contribute to economic growth in the region. 
Moreover, they have the potential to reduce poverty and vulnerability. Because of variation in agricultural 
production—in terms of what is produced (cash crops or staples) and how productive agriculture is—
African regions are pitted with food-surplus and food-deficit areas. Such areas can be linked by transport 
corridors and feeder roads to increase food security in the region. Seasonal price volatility is also an 
important factor constraining agricultural growth and adaptation of new technology by farmers. Prices can 
collapse during harvest season and double during lean seasons. Given different agro-ecological conditions 
between neighboring countries within a subregion of Africa, increasing intraregional trade can 
significantly lower seasonable price volatility.  
The potential of transport corridors in Africa to induce these kinds of positive effects on 
economic development is highlighted by the fact that most such corridors typically run through or near 
Africa’s most population-dense areas (World Bank 2008). The corridors therefore have the ability to 
directly or, through feeder roads, indirectly reach the majority of Africa’s populations. Improving 
transport corridors requires policymakers to address a broad range of problems (see Box 3). In the past, 
large investments in improving road infrastructure were seen as the primary means of reducing transport 
prices. Although such improvements were essential to facilitate road transport and resulted in lower costs 
for the trucks carrying cargo on the corridors, no clear impact on transport prices has thus far been  
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evident. A review of the World Bank’s African corridor projects by the Bank’s evaluation group found 
that most projects were limited in coverage to a single transport mode, a single government agency, and a 
single investment strategy (the development or rehabilitation of physical facilities), without putting in 
place the prerequisites for future operations such as regional agreements on corridor operations and the 
streamlining and harmonizing of regulation affecting transport. 
Box 3. Addressing Africa’s transport corridors 
Despite their great potential, Africa’s transport corridors need attention in the following areas:  
Port Formalities 
•  Port formalities are inefficient and complicated due to lack of harmonization. 
•  Information and communications technology instrument use is inadequate. UNCTAD’s Advance Cargo 
Information System is not used in the sub-region.  
•  Port clearing formalities take up to 10 days. 
Border Formalities 
•  There is a multiplicity of customs documents and no harmonization of procedures.  
•  Little progress has been achieved on implementation of the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) Inter-State Road Transit (ISRT) Convention.  
•  Protocols on the free movement of persons and goods have been inadequately implemented. 
Control and Harassment 
•  Customs and police control and harassment are a major cause of delay in road corridors.  
•  Frequency of checkpoints is as high as one in every 10 kilometers in some corridors.  
•  Average cost per checkpoint is 20 minutes and 20,000 CFA francs.  
•  Undue payments account for 10 percent of transport costs. 
Political Factors 
•  Implementation of regional agreements on transit transport is poor.  
•  Political instability hinders implementation of several ECOWAS agreements. 
•  Police and customs harassment increases in periods of political instability and insecurity. 
Economic Factors 
•  Most aspects of customs control are motivated by lack of diverse sources of fiscal revenue.  
•  Import duties contribute a large share of fiscal revenue.  
Transport Infrastructure  
•  Infrastructure network is thin. 
•  National railways are poorly interconnected. 
•  Inadequate maintenance and improper practices contribute to rapid deterioration. 
•  Vehicle fleets are often old and poorly maintained. 
•  Most vehicles do not meet standards for international transit transport. 
Human Resource Capacity 
•  Low capacity is particularly acute in areas of customs clearing and vehicle operations. 
•  Some freight-forwarding agents are not adequately trained. 
•  Most vehicle operators are illiterate and inadequately trained. 
The following new initiatives are under way to improve Africa’s transport corridors: 
•  Implementation of ECOWAS’s ISRT Convention 
•  Monitoring of improper practices in transit corridors 
•  Improvement of fluidity of road transit traffic 
•  HIV/AIDS control in transit transport corridor 
•  Infrastructure development 
 
Sources: Kodgo Evlo (Université de Lomé); Independent Evaluation Group, the World Bank.  
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Recent partnerships between African governments and donors are learning from this experience 
by emphasizing the critical importance of reforming the broader transport environment in the corridors. 
The Improved Road Transport Governance Initiative—a partnership between the United States Agency 
for International Development and several local bodies—monitors harmful road practices on interstate 
trunk roads between Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) and Tema (Ghana) and Bamako (Mali) and Lomé 
(Togo). That initiative has analyzed various nonphysical sources of higher transport costs (e.g., number of 
checkpoints, degree of regulation, prevalence of corruption) and also which countries and borders 
produce the most delays. Similar efforts are being devoted to achieving cross-country agreements, 
controlling HIV/AIDS, encouraging market development along the corridors, and upgrading and 
extending the corridors’ physical infrastructure. 
Investing in Rural Roads 
Along the trade corridors in many countries, other principal intercity and rural feeder roads are often in 
much poorer condition than the main roads. Exceptions are found in countries such as Zambia, Tanzania, 
Ghana, and Nigeria, where there have been increased investments in improving both highways and 
intercity roads. However, even in those countries feeder roads linking to the rural areas remain in poor 
condition. Moreover, existing roads remain poorly maintained in the majority of countries, making the 
improvement of rural roads and highways equally important.  
Improving rural road networks is essential to promote social and agricultural development and 
reduce transaction costs. Only through well-maintained roads can rural areas become less isolated. While 
many studies have shown public expenditure on agriculture, especially on agricultural R&D, to yield high 
returns, the similar literature also finds high returns from infrastructure investments, especially in rural 
roads. According to Fan (2008), in India roads had the largest poverty reduction impact per million rupees 
spent (lifting 123.8 people out of poverty); agricultural R&D was second (84.5), education a distant third 
(41), and no other expenditure came close (including antipoverty programs). The same three foci are 
found to have similarly high returns in China in terms of rural GDP growth and agricultural GDP growth; 
roads and education also brought high returns in nonfarm GDP. Similar results were found in Thailand for 
roads and agricultural R&D. Studies in African countries show a similar picture. For example, a study in 
Uganda found that a million shillings spent on agricultural R&D lifted the most people out of poverty 
(58.39), followed by feeder roads (33.77), while education again came a distant third (12.81) (see Table 
3.6, p. 85, in Fan 2008); Fan, Nyange, and Rao (2003) report similar results for Tanzania. A recent study 
by Bird, McKay, and Shinyekwa (2007) also found that physical isolation and poor infrastructure are 
leading causes of poverty in Uganda. 
The importance of rural roads can scarcely be overemphasized. Roads are literally the foundation 
of rural development in that good road networks lower the costs of everything else: rural electrification, 
irrigation, fertilizers, education and health services, agricultural extension services, financial services, 
output markets, and a whole host of other goods and services, all of which produce dynamic linkages to 
new opportunities for migration, investment, and trade. Physical infrastructure investments in rural Africa 
are a necessary condition for agricultural growth and overall rural development. 
Reducing Policy and Institutional Barriers to Agricultural Trade 
Over the last 20 years developing countries, including countries in Africa, have made great strides in 
reducing price distortions against their own agriculture sectors, largely by realigning their exchange rates 
and liberalizing trade (Anderson 2008). The remaining distortions against agriculture largely take the 
form of tariff and nontariff barriers to imports in developed and developing countries. As Figure 11 
demonstrates, tariffs against agricultural products are generally high both within Africa and also in 
developed countries, and agricultural tariffs are much higher than nonagricultural tariffs. However, there 
is still some debate as to how much these distortions cost poor countries. Hertel et al. (2006) use detailed 
data on farm incomes to show that major commodity programs in developed countries are highly 
regressive, and that the only serious losses under Doha-type trade reform are among wealthy farmers in a  
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few heavily protected subsectors of developed countries. In contrast, analysis of household data from 15 
developing countries indicates that reforming rich countries’ agricultural trade policies would lift large 
numbers of farm households in developing countries out of poverty. In the majority of cases such gains 
are not outweighed by the poverty-increasing effects of higher food prices among other households. 
Finally, Hertel et al.’s analysis also finds that maximal trade-led poverty reductions occur when 
developing countries participate more fully in agricultural trade liberalization. 
Figure 11. Agricultural tariffs are still high 
 
Source: Calculated by Dimaranan and Mevel (2008) from 2004 MAcMap database. Averages are unweighted. 
The recent rise in food prices has prompted several African countries to reduce and even 
eliminate tariffs on food imports. But other countries, such as Uganda, argue that tariffs on key staples 
have helped promote more agricultural growth (Zachary 2008). Many poor countries also have weak 
fiscal systems and rely on tariffs for public revenue, while the predominance of poor people in rural areas 
also motivates governments to protect poor farmers. Moreover, whereas average tariffs are reasonably 
low, tariffs on particular products can be quite high, often without much rationale. Tariffs also limit the 
scope of the market for small African countries, increasing the costs of regional trade and reducing 
market access, which is especially costly for areas of high food insecurity in Africa.  
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6.  CONCLUSIONS 
Rising international food prices pose a serious threat to as well as an opportunity for Africa’s food 
security and future growth prospects. This paper has proposed that the two most important components of 
a strategy to use the situation as an opportunity are continentwide policy actions aimed at simultaneously 
accelerating African staples productivity and expanding market access. We have subjected this hypothesis 
to a rigorous simulation analysis. Based on the analysis, the two-pronged staples-led growth strategy can 
be expected to achieve the following outcomes: 
•  Increased food security—Africa’s dependency on cereal imports will decline by a third, and 
Africa will move from deficit to surplus in a number of other important staples, such as maize, 
roots, and tubers. Food prices will decline but will decline by more than 25 percent for consumers 
and only around 10 percent for producers, which ensures that farmers will have strong incentives 
to sustain productivity growth. The availability of food will increase by more than 50 percent in 
the region and more than 70 percent if in conjunction with greater regional integration to facilitate 
trade between food-surplus and food-deficit countries. Thus, Africa will become much more food 
secure.  
•  New market opportunities for staples—Surpluses created from rapid productivity growth will 
expect to open up new export markets for African farmers, as well as new opportunities for 
private investments in modernized agroprocessing and livestock sectors that use staples as inputs. 
•  Increased farmer revenues—Increased productivity in conjunction with greater market access 
means that producer prices will decline less than consumer prices, which increases farmer 
revenue from major staples by $40 billion.  
•  Broader economic transformation—Rapid growth in staples productivity will catalyze broader 
economic growth in African economies through increased demand for nonagricultural goods and 
services, expanding the scope of markets through international trade and facilitated technological 
spillovers. The annual growth rate in GDP for the 17 countries as a whole rises to 7.1 percent, and 
will further increase to 7.7 percent with more integrated regional markets. 
•  Large-scale poverty reduction—A staples-led strategy can be expected to lift more than 100 
million Africans out of poverty, precisely because food consumption is so important to Africa’s 
poor and food production is largely concentrated among poor African smallholders. 
Skeptics might justifiably ask whether these results—accelerating staples production growth in 
conjunction with very large improvements in market access—are really feasible. Indeed, the objective of 
simulation analysis is not to predict what will be most likely to happen in the next five years but rather to 
demonstrate how the world might look if policymakers were to take alternative and scaled-up actions. In 
this vein, the simulation results can be regarded as providing useful benchmarks. Full regional integration, 
for example, will be most unlikely to be achieved within five years, but the results show that moving in 
that direction is indeed a worthwhile goal. 
Finally, the most important response to skeptics is that there are feasible policy actions that can 
move Africa a long way toward achieving the aforementioned outcomes. The most important 
interventions involve a range of scaled-up actions chiefly targeted at modernizing smallholder production 
and improving market access for both rural and urban populations. An appropriate set of policy actions 
consists of the following: 
•  Accelerating public investment and strengthening public provision—This includes a range of 
public investments and other policy actions to facilitate the use of a modernization package for 
agriculture: high-yielding seed varieties, irrigation, fertilizers, and pesticides. Whilst this is a 
combination of inputs that has been validated by Asian experience, existing research also finds 
that Africa stands to benefit substantially from precisely these types of investments (Johnson,  
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Hazell, and Gulati 2003). The public investment in agriculture required to support the rapid 
agricultural growth is estimated to be about US$38 billion in total or US$7.8 billion per annum. If 
current government spending patterns continue, the outlay will not be sufficient for achieving the 
accelerated growth discussed in this paper. On the other hand, achieving the CAADP 10 percent 
targets would provide more than 80 percent of the required expenditure, meaning that the 
remaining investments could feasibly be financed from donors, foreign direct investment, 
nongovernmental organizations, and other sources. 
•  Investing in transport corridors and local rural infrastructure—Africa’s largest transport 
corridors already have the potential to promote trade and migration among millions of Africans, 
but they require improvements in the physical quality of roads and ports, as well as a range of 
regulatory reforms. Local rural infrastructure also needs to be extended to access more isolated 
populations. 
•  Reducing trade barriers—Relative to nonagricultural goods, trade barriers for agricultural goods 
are still high in Africa and the rest of the world. With improvements in rural infrastructure, 
reductions in trade barriers would provide strong incentives for African smallholders to increase 
production and would reduce food prices for urban consumers. 
Without these actions the average African farmer will continue to eke out a subsistence living just 
as his or her forebears did, even as shrinking farm sizes, declining land quality, and an increasingly 
adverse climate force most of his or her children to seek out informal work in overcrowded urban slums, 
where the vagaries of the weather are replaced by the vagaries of international food prices. In both cases, 
hunger and hard living will continue to be the norm. This course is not inevitable, however, precisely 
because the policy actions described above can make a decisive difference. Amidst equally unfavorable 
circumstances almost four decades ago, underdeveloped Asia radically changed its course for the better. 
Africa has at least as much natural potential and human capacity as Asia had before its transformation, but 
the missing ingredient thus far has been the political will and financial muscle of both African and 
international policymakers. This urgently needs to change.  
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APPENDIX A:  MATHEMATICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE ECONOMYWIDE 
MULTIMARKET MODEL FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN ECONOMIES 
The economywide multimarket (EMM) model for Sub-Saharan Africa is based on neoclassical 
microeconomic theory; it includes 17 Sub-Saharan African countries (Angola, Cameroon, Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia) and three sub-African regions (rest of East Africa, rest of 
Southern Africa excluding South Africa, and rest of West Africa), such that the entirety of Sub-Saharan 
Africa (excluding South Africa) is covered in the study. The model includes 15 agricultural commodities 
or commodity crops and two aggregate nonagricultural activities (livestock production and 
nonagricultural production). The agricultural commodities are maize, rice, sorghum, millet, wheat, barley, 
other cereals, cassava, yams, other roots, oil crops, pulses, other crops, poultry, and other livestock, and 
the nonagricultural sectors are industry and services. 
Supply Functions 
Consistent with most multimarket model setups, the supply function, instead of the production function, is 
used to capture producers’ responses to market prices and growth in productivity. The supply functions 
for crop production contain two components: (1) yield functions that are used to capture supply response 
to own prices given farm area allocated to the particular crop and growth in yield; and (2) land allocation 
functions that are functions of all prices and hence are responsive to changing profitability across 
different crops given the total available land. 
The yield function (for crops) is given by 
 
i R
t i R t i R P Y
,
, , t R,i, , , YA
α =
, (1) 
where  t i R Y , ,  is the yield for crop i in country/region R at time period t, and  t i R P , ,  is the producer price for 
i and can be different across countries.  i R, α
 is the supply elasticity of the own price.  t i R YA , ,  is the 
productivity shift parameter, which changes exogenously over time: 
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i R Y t i R g
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where 
i R Y g
,  is the annual productivity growth rate in yield, which is exogenous in the model. 
The area function (for crops) is given by 
 
0 , AA , , , t i, R, , ,
, = = ∑ ∏
J
j




where  t i R A , ,  is the area for crop i, and P1, P2, … PJ, is the vector of producer prices for all commodities 
(including the two nonagricultural sectors);  t i R , , AA
 is the shift parameter, which captures the area 
expansion: 
  ( )
i R A t i R g
, 1 AA AA t R,i, 1 , , + = + , (4) 
where 
i R A g
,  is the annual area expansion rate for crop i, which is assumed exogenous in order to capture 
historical crop- and country-specific trends. Given that many prices are endogenous in the model, area 
functions, similar to the supply functions for noncrop production, capture cross-sector linkages among  
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crops, between crop and noncrop agriculture (such as livestock), and between agriculture and 
nonagriculture through the price elasticities,  i R, β
, which is for the own- and cross-price elasticities. 
The total supply of crops is given by 
 
t i R t i R t i R A Y S , , , , , , ⋅ =∑ . (5) 
The supply function for noncrop sectors (livestock and nonagriculture) is given by 
  ∏ =
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β
. (6) 
Trends in the livestock and nonagricultural supply function are represented by 
  ( )
i R S g




1 t i, R, + = + , (7) 
where 
i R S g
,  is the annual growth rate of livestock and nonagricultural productivity and varies by country 
and commodity. As we mentioned above, gY, gA, and gS are all exogenous in the model. 
LV
i R, β
 is the 
output own- and cross-price elasticities.  
Own-Price and Cross-Price Supply Elasticities 
It is almost impossible to estimate supply elasticities for all agricultural commodities across 17 countries 
based on historical data. Thus, own-price elasticity in the supply functions is drawn from the literature 
and is assumed to be the same in the supply function of a similar commodity across countries. According 
to an intensive literature review done by You and his assistant under IFPRI’s project Dynamic Research 
Evaluation for Management (DREAM), own-price elasticities in the supply function for those agricultural 
commodities that are also included in our model vary between 0.1 and 1.5 in the short run. The values can 
reach as high as 2.4 or 4.1 in the long run for maize and wheat, respectively. The former value is 
estimated for large maize farmers in Kenya by Maitha (1974) during the period 1950–1969 through 
acreage response. In the same country, Liu and Romingen
7 (1985) determined the supply elasticity of 
wheat to be 4.1 through direct estimation of the supply function using 1964–1979 data.  
Estimation in short-run supply response in the literature reveals a diverse outcome. With regard to 
rice, for example, the short-run elasticities range from 0.11 as reported in Rojko et al. (1978) for Sierra 
Leone to 0.484 for Kenya according to Sarris and Freebairn (1983). Sarris and Freebairn (1983), using the 
grains, oilseeds, and livestock model, also calculated the long-run elasticity of rice in Kenya, and it equals 
1.363. For sorghum, Davis, Oram, and Ryan (1987) reported short-run supply elasticity around 0.10 in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, while Medani (1970) provided an upper range of 0.31 in Sudan using acreage 
responses for the period 1951–1965. Medani also came up with a 0.09 and 0.36 short- and long-run 
elasticity of millet in Sudan, respectively, while Davis, Oram, and Ryan (1987) provided a value of 0.40 
as supply elasticity for pulses in Sub-Saharan Africa. Relying on expert estimates, Rosegrant et al. (2001) 
indicated that in the same region, elasticity for cassava is 0.15, while that for poultry is 0.30. Based on 
Frohberg and Kromer (1985),
8 supply elasticity for root crops and other cereals (excluding rice) is 0.10.  
Based on the literature reviewed, we decided to have a similar own-price elasticity in both yield 
and area functions across commodities and countries (see Appendix Table C.1). After that, the negative 
cross-price elasticities in the area (or supply) function are derived from the own-price elasticity multiplied 
by the value share of each commodity at the national level (with a negative sign). The homogeneity of 
degree zero condition is imposed on the supply function such that, within each time period, there is no 
supply response if all prices change proportionally. The constraint on crop area function is also imposed 
to avoid a simultaneous expansion of all crop areas over a given time period due to price response. The 
                                                      
7 As cited by Henneberry (1986) in Appendix VI. 
8 As cited by Henneberry (1986) in Appendix VI.  
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elasticities in the area (supply) functions for agricultural production averaged over the 17 countries are 
reported in Appendix Table C.2. While there is similar own-price elasticity in supply functions for a same 
crop across countries, due to differences in crop patterns between the countries, the cross-price elasticities 
differ across countries, which results in a country-different supply response to a similar change in a 
commodity price.  
Demand Functions 
The country-level demand function for each good is derived from maximizing a Stone-Geary type of 
utility function. The actual function used in the model is dependent on all prices and income. It is 
determined as follows: 
 
,, ,
,, , , ,
I
Ri j R i
Rit R jt Rt j DC PC GDP
ε ε =∏ , (8) 
where DCR,I,t is the demand for commodity i in country R, and PCR,j,t is the consumer price for j in country 
R. j = 1,2,…,17 (including two aggregate nonagricultural goods). GDPR,t is total income (GDP) for 
country R.  j i R , , ε  is the price elasticity between demand for commodity i and price for commodity j, and 
I
i R, ε
 is income elasticity for commodity i. 
The income elasticity is evaluated using Ghana’s recent household survey data (GLSSV 2005/06) 
at the sample means of all households, and the coefficients to calculate the elasticity are estimated from a 
semi-log inverse function (RSLI) suggested by King and Byerlee (1978). The price elasticities are then 
derived from the linear expenditure of demand solved from maximizing the Stone-Geary utility function 
such that the budget constraint is satisfied for each demand function. That is: 
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 where  i Z R sh , ,  is the expenditure share of commodity i. Income and price 
elasticities in demand function are reported in Appendix Tables C.3 and C.4. 
Due to lack of household survey data for many countries, we assume that the income elasticity for 
each commodity is the same across 17 countries/regions, while price elasticities for any specific 
commodity vary across countries due to different consumption patterns at the country level. However, 
income elasticity is different for different commodities, and these variations across commodities affect the 
ratio of subsistence consumption over market demand for a specific commodity. Moreover, the variations 
in consumption patterns across countries affect the average budget share of each commodity in total 
expenditure. These two factors determine that for a similar change in prices or income, changes in the 
demand for a specific commodity are different across commodities and between countries. For a 
commodity with a large budget share (i.e., a staple crop such as maize or cassava), both income and own-
price elasticities in the demand function are low relative to other commodities with smaller initial budget 
shares but higher income elasticities (such as poultry).  
Exports, Imports, and Producer and Consumer Prices 
As the name of the model suggests, a multiple market structure is specified. There is perfect substitution 
between domestically and internationally produced commodities. Transportation and other market costs 
or barriers, however, distinguish prices for domestically traded products from imports and exports. 
Moreover, trade (either in imports or exports) is determined by the difference between national market 
prices and import/export parity prices (in which transportation and trade margins are taken into 
consideration). For example, while imported maize can perfectly substitute with domestically produced 
maize in consumers’ demand functions, maize may still not be profitable to import if its domestic price is 
lower than the import parity price less transaction costs and other trade barriers. Maize imports can occur  
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only when domestic demand for maize grows faster than domestic supply and the local market price rises 
significantly. A similar situation applies to exported commodities. Even though certain horticultural 
products are exportable, if domestic production is not competitive in international markets, either due to 
low productivity or high transaction costs, then exports will not be profitable. Only when domestic 
producer prices plus market costs are lower than the export parity price of the same product does it 
become profitable to export. Moreover, an initial imported commodity, such as rice, can become 
exportable if the domestic rice price falls to the level of the export parity price minus export margins after 
significantly rising rice productivity. 
In this study, we also assume the existence of transportation margins between producer and 
consumer prices, such as 
  ( ) t i R i R t i R P Dm PC , , , , , 1 ⋅ + =
,   (9) 
where  t i R PC , ,
 is consumer price and PR,i,t producer price in domestic market R for commodity i; DmR,i is 
the domestic marketing margin between consumer and producer prices, and can vary by country. 
The relationship between import parity prices and consumer prices is defined as  
  ( ) , 1 , , , , i R i R t i R PWM Wmt PC ⋅ + ≤
 Mi > 0 if “=”  (10) 
where WmtR,i is the marketing margin between the country’s CIF prices,  i R PWM , , and consumer prices, 
t i R PC , , , in domestic markets for commodity i. When  t i R PC , ,  is less than ( ) , 1 , , i R i R PWM Wmt ⋅ +
  t i R PC , ,  
is an endogenous price determined by domestic supply and domestic demand. The equation holds only 
when the imports are positive. In this situation, the domestic price for commodity i in country R 
exogenously links with its border price. Thus, equation (10) is also a function for imports of i in country 
R. The relationship between export parity and domestic producer prices is given by  
  ( ) i i R t i R PWE Wmt P ⋅ − ≥ , , , 1
, Ei > 0 if “=”  (11) 
where PWER,i represents export border prices. If PR,i,t is greater than ( ) i i R PWE Wmt ⋅ − , 1
, PR,i,t is an 
endogenous price determined by domestic supply and demand. The equation holds only when the exports 
are positive. Thus, equation (11) is also a function for exports of i from country R. The combination of 
equations (10) and (11) indicates that for any commodity i in country R it is impossible to be both 
imported and exported in the same time period, although it is possible for an imported (exported) one to 
switch to an exported (imported) one when the endogenous domestic price for i in country R changes 
significantly.  
Balance of Demand and Supply at the National Level 
At the national level, the balance of demand (DC) and supply is given by 
  ,, ,, ,, ,, Rit Rit Rit Rit SMED C +− =
. (12) 
This equation solves for the price of commodity i in country R if both imports (M) and exports 
(E) are zero (S) is domestic supply. Otherwise, it solves for the value of M or E.  
Income (GDP) Function 
Income in the model is endogenous and determined by production revenues. Given that the model does 
not explicitly include inputs, producer prices are adjusted to represent value added, and hence, the 
aggregation of agricultural production equals agricultural GDP. For the two nonagricultural sectors, the  
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sector-level GDP is used to represent production output with unit price. Thus, national GDP comprises 
agricultural GDP and nonagricultural GDP, which are both endogenous in the model. Hence the 
aggregation of sectoral GDP which represents the income level in the demand function: 
 
,, , , , , R tR j t R j t j GDP P S =⋅ ∑    (13) 
Simulations of the EMM Model 
Two types of simulations are conducted using the EMM model for Africa. In the first scenario, we 
consider only productivity growth, together with modest land expansion. The total increase in yield by 
crop and country is calculated based on the yield potential, and such potential is calculated based on the 
gap between the current actual yield and the yield achieved in the region for some countries (in most 
cases, in South Africa). The average annual growth rate, 
i R Y g
, , is then calculated based on that potential 
such that  ( )
i R Y t i R g
, 1 YA YA t R,i, 1 , , + = +  defined in equation (2) is augmented exogenously for the next five 
years between 2009 and 2013. The land expansion is based on the historical trends of recent years and 
varies across countries and crops. Population growth rate affects the rate of land expansion but is not 
directly included in the model. Only when we report the per capita income and consumption is population 
growth taken into account. 
, R i A g
 and 
i R Y g
,  are represented in Appendix Tables C.5 and C.6. It is important 
to note that due to the price effect and supply responses to the changes in the endogenous prices, the 
actual growth rates in both yield and area expansion are endogenous model results and are therefore 
different from the initial exogenous “shocks” to output and land expansion (
i R Y g
, and 
, R i A g
). The model 
results for the first simulation are presented in Appendix Tables A7 and A8.  
In the second type of simulation we try to capture the effects of increasing market access. In this 
scenario, in addition to the shocks imposed in the first simulation, we assume that similar regional prices 
penetrate markets across the region, such that the domestic price for a similar commodity is the same 
across countries expressed in U.S. dollars. Specifically, equation (12) is now defined at the regional 
instead of the national level—that is,  
 
,, ,, ,, ,, () Rit Rit Rit RR Rit SME D C +−= ∑∑ . (12′) 
A single price for commodity i, instead for it in each country R, can be solved from equation 
(12′). Market integration is often an outcome of the removal of tariff, nontariff, and other institutional 
barriers, as well as improvements in cross- and within-country transportation conditions. Because of this, 
in the second simulation we further assume that the market margin between producer and consumer prices 
in each domestic market, which is 40 percent of the producer prices, is lowered by 15 percent annually. 
This implies that the gap between the domestic consumer and producer price is lowered from 40 percent 
to 18 percent of the producer price by the end of the next five years. With this model setup and 
assumptions, consumer prices still fall considerably as comparable with that in the first simulation, but 
producer prices fall much less, as we have discussed in the main text of the paper. The public investment 
cost related to the market integration and improvements in cross- and within-country transportation, 
however, is not calculated in the model because of the lack of enough information and data.  
Limitations of the EMM Model 
Like any other economic model, the EMM model has its limitations, especially when compared with a 
standard general equilibrium model (e.g., computable general equilibrium [CGE] models). Of the 
limitations, there are at least four important ones. First, the model does not include government income 
and expenditure or policy instruments and investment activities. These issues are therefore discussed  
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separately in Section 5 (Appendix B provides additional details), where we employ econometrically 
derived elasticities for agricultural growth and public expenditure on agriculture from existing literature.  
Second, unlike country-specific models, the current EMM model does not directly assess within-
country differentiations in both production and consumption. The within-country poverty impacts, 
including the impacts on subgroups such as net food consumers or net food producers, cannot be analyzed 
using the current version of the EMM model. In Section 4 we therefore adopt a second-best approach by 
estimating the impact of our EMM-derived agricultural growth rates on poverty reduction through a series 
of growth–poverty reduction elasticities defined at the country level and drawn from the existing literature 
(Appendix B provides additional details).  
Third, one of the key channels to generate economywide linkages in a general equilibrium model 
is through factor mobility and demand on intermediate inputs. These types of linkages are ignored in the 
EMM model due to the absence of a production-and-demand-for-inputs specification in the model. Aside 
from land, the model does not take into consideration the use of labor, capital, and other purchased inputs 
in production, including capital accumulation. For example, one would expect that the doubling of staples 
production will initially require drawing resources (capital, labor) away from the livestock and 
nonagricultural sectors. In the longer term, however, staples growth in agriculture can actually have 
positive multiplier effects on these sectors (Delgado, Hopkins, and Kelly 1998). Linkages between staples 
growth and the livestock sector are discussed further below. As for labor, the effect of rapid staples-led 
growth on sectoral labor supplies and migration decisions is quite ambiguous. Intersectoral migration 
depends on a number of factors, including intersector differentials in growth rates, labor intensities, and 
income volatilities, as well as a range of more complex economic and noneconomic factors (Todaro 
1997). Modeling these complex decisions is beyond the scope of an EMM model, and certainly one 
limitation of its use.  
Although land allocation is included in the EMM model, the ability to reallocate land is relatively 
more rigid than in a CGE model because of the model’s use of supply functions instead of production 
functions. While resource immobility may be a problem in a dynamic model focusing on long-run 
structural change, given that the EMM model is used for simulations over the next six to seven years, we 
are less concerned by this shortcoming. Moreover, we do not expect that a staples-led growth strategy 
would attract a substantial amount of additional resources for two reasons. First, the additional growth in 
output is assumed to be driven by rapidly rising staple crop yields rather than increased use of resources. 
Second, output growth in staples will always remain constrained by the demand side. Productivity growth 
in staples is expected to actually release more resources (e.g., land) from staples production to other crop 
production such as high-value export crops. This explains the observed strong multiplier effects of the 
food staples sector for overall economic growth (see Diao et al. 2007).  
Sensitivity Tests on the Supply and Demand Elasticities of the EMM Model  
In a CGE model, due to full general equilibrium linkages, the inclusion of factor endowments, together 
with the assumption of imperfect substitution between domestically produced and consumed goods and 
imported and exported goods, the simulation results of the model are usually not sensitive to the choice of 
elasticities in the production and demand equations. However, in an EMM model, as with any other 
simulation model with reduced-form supply and demand functions, the simulation results are often 
sensitive to the choice of elasticities in the supply and demand functions. As we discussed earlier, the 
supply elasticity is mainly drawn from literature, while the income elasticity in demand is estimated using 
Ghana’s household-level data. This income elasticity, combined with expenditure shares by commodity 
across countries, is used to calculate price elasticities in the demand function such that the summation of 
these elasticities satisfies standard conditions imposed by economic theory. However, supply elasticities 
are often independently estimated for individual commodities in the literature and are often quite country 
specific. On the demand side, the income elasticity applied in our model is not estimated country by 
country due to data constraints. For these reasons, a series of sensitivity tests are conducted to justify the 
model results. For brevity’s sake, we report only the results of the sensitivity tests for the price effects  
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(i.e., those presented in Figure 4 in the main text), which are based on different choices of elasticities in 
the demand function (see Appendix Table A.9).  
The conclusion of the sensitivity tests is that the model results are not sensitive to the choice of 
supply elasticities, which vary in a range of −50 percent to +50 percent of the value applied in the model, 
or the choice of income elasticities in the demand function when it is income inelastic (with a value less 
than one) and varies in a range of −25% to +25% of the value applied in the model. However, the model 
results (particular changes in the prices) are sensitive to the choice of income elasticity switching from 
income elastic to income inelastic and vice versa. That is to say, if rice or poultry becomes an income-
inelastic commodity as the value of income elasticity in its demand function changes from greater than 1 
to less than 1, the price of rice or poultry can fall much more if its demand becomes income inelastic, 
while it can fall much less and even rise if the demand becomes very income elastic. The difference in 
terms of the change in rice price between these two cases can be four times, and the price of poultry can 
even rise when its demand becomes very income elastic. Given that demand for most agricultural 
products is income inelastic, we have less concern for these extreme cases that apply only to a very few 
commodities, such as rice, wheat, and livestock in Africa.  
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APPENDIX B:  CALCULATION OF REQUIRED PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN 
AGRICULTURE AND EXPECTED POVERTY REDUCTION 
Reported results of the public investment in agriculture required to achieve the expected growth rate, as 
well as the extent of poverty reduction predicted by such rapid agricultural growth, are not drawn from 
within the EMM model. Instead, we linked the model results at the individual-country level with (a) 
elasticities of agricultural growth with respect to public investment to calculate the required agricultural 
spending, and (b) elasticities of poverty reduction with respect to agricultural GDP growth to estimate the 
extent of poverty reduction predicted by growth acceleration. For the methodology to derive the 
elasticities of agricultural growth with respect to public investment we draw from Fan (2008), and for the 
calculation of poverty reduction we take into consideration both the direct and the indirect impacts of 
growth (Diao et al. 2007; Christiaensen, Demery, and Kühl 2006). 
The level of public expenditure is determined by agricultural growth, and such growth is 
endogenously obtained in our model. The elasticity of agricultural growth with respect to public 
investment is drawn from Fan (2008) and is assumed to be the same across countries (with a value of 
0.318). Current-level public spending on agriculture and its share in total government spending are 
reported in Appendix Table C.10. 
The rate of poverty reduction is also determined by agricultural GDP growth derived from our 
model. The elasticities of poverty reduction with respect to GDP growth came from different sources. For 
instance, using a series of economywide models, Diao et al. (2007) derive an elasticity of poverty 
reduction with respect to agricultural GDP of −1.66 for Ethiopia, −1.78 for Ghana, −1.25 for Kenya, 
−1.58 for Uganda, and −0.58 for Zambia. For the other countries where our own estimation is 
unavailable, we draw from recent Africa-wide estimates of Christiaensen, Demery, and Kühl (2006) 
indicating that the elasticity of poverty reduction with respect to agricultural GDP in low-income 
countries for Africa is −1.83. It can be seen that despite differences in the methods, the elasticities 
estimated by Diao et al. (2007) are comparable with those by Christiaensen, Demery, and Kühl for the 
low-income countries. Appendix Table C.10 shows the current poverty rate by country. 
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APPENDIX C:  SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES 








Other cereals  0.47 
Cassava 0.52 
Yam 0.45 
Other roots  0.40 
Oil crops  0.40 
Pulses 0.40 
Other crops  0.40 
Poultry 0.50 
Other livestock  0.40 
Source: Results are derived from literature review. 
Note: The elasticities are for crop production aggregated over yield and area functions, and averaged over 17 countries. 
 
Table C.2. Own- and cross-price elasticity in agricultural supply function (average over 17 
countries) 
 
 Maize  Rice  Sorghum  Millet  Wheat  Barley  Other 
cereals 
Cassava 
Maize 0.200  -0.015  -0.010  -0.006 -0.007 -0.001 -0.003 -0.026 
Rice -0.017  0.200  -0.009  -0.008 -0.001 0.000  -0.001 -0.022 
Sorghum -0.021  -0.017  0.200  -0.008 -0.005 -0.001 -0.003 -0.028 
Millet -0.019  -0.024  -0.013  0.200 -0.002  0.000 -0.001  -0.025 
Wheat -0.040  -0.003  -0.013  -0.003 0.200  -0.006 -0.014 -0.008 
Barley -0.041  -0.001  -0.014  -0.003 -0.031 0.200  -0.019 0.000 
Other cereals  -0.037  -0.005  -0.014  -0.004 -0.027 -0.007 0.200  -0.003 
Cassava -0.031  -0.024  -0.016  -0.009 -0.002 0.000  0.000  0.270 
Yam -0.021  -0.026  -0.016  -0.014  0.000 0.000 -0.001  -0.038 
Other roots  -0.029  -0.015  -0.011  -0.005 -0.008 -0.002 -0.004 -0.027 
Oil crops  -0.020  -0.021  -0.012  -0.009 -0.002 0.000  -0.001 -0.029 
Pulses -0.028  -0.017  -0.012  -0.007 -0.007 -0.002 -0.004 -0.024 
Other crops  -0.025  -0.017  -0.012  -0.007 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.029 
Poultry -0.082  -0.035  -0.064  -0.041 -0.011 -0.005 -0.013 0.000 
Other 
livestock  -0.066 -0.028  -0.051 -0.033  -0.009 -0.004 -0.010 0.000  
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Table C.2. Continued 
Source: Calculated based on literature review 
  Yam  Other roots  Oil crops  Pulses  Other 
crops  Poultry  Other 
livestock 
Maize  -0.007  -0.010  -0.029  -0.008  0.000 0.087 0.070 
Rice  -0.010  -0.005  -0.033  -0.005  0.000 0.149 0.119 
Sorghum  -0.012  -0.008  -0.037  -0.008  0.000 0.038 0.031 
Millet  -0.016  -0.006  -0.045  -0.007  0.000 0.030 0.024 
Wheat  -0.001  -0.014  -0.012  -0.011  0.000 0.061 0.048 
Barley  -0.001  -0.017  -0.007  -0.013  0.000 0.021 0.017 
Other  cereals  -0.003  -0.015  -0.013  -0.012  0.000 0.043 0.034 
Cassava  -0.016  -0.011  -0.050  -0.009  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Yam  0.250  -0.008  -0.061  -0.008  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other  roots  -0.008  0.200  -0.028  -0.010  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Oil  crops  -0.015  -0.007  0.200  -0.007  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pulses  -0.010  -0.011  -0.032  0.200  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other  crops  -0.008  -0.009  -0.035  -0.008  0.200 0.000 0.000 
Poultry  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.500 -0.101 
Other livestock  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.014  0.400  
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Other cereals  0.45 
Cassava 0.55 
Yam 0.48 
Other roots  0.50 
Oil crops  0.75 
Pulses 0.60 
Other crops  0.90 
Poultry 1.45 
Other livestock  0.98 
Industry 1.07 
Services 1.10 
Source: Estimated using Ghana’s recent household survey (GLSSV, 2005/06) data.  
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Table C.4. Price elasticity in the demand function (average over 17 countries) 
 Maize  Rice  Sorghum  Millet  Wheat  Barley  Other 
cereals  Cassava Yam 
Maize -0.470  -0.003  -0.004  -0.002  -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.008  -0.002 
Rice  -0.006 -0.953 -0.006  -0.005 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.015  -0.006 
Sorghum -0.004  -0.003  -0.424  -0.003  -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.009  -0.003 
Millet -0.003  -0.004  -0.004  -0.470  -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.007  -0.004 
Wheat -0.011  -0.005  -0.012  -0.004  -0.929 -0.003 -0.006 -0.017  -0.005 
Barley -0.008  -0.001  -0.006  -0.001  -0.006 -0.373 -0.009 0.000  0.000 
Other 
cereals -0.007  -0.001  -0.006  -0.002  -0.005 -0.004 -0.379 -0.001  -0.001 
Cassava -0.004  -0.003  -0.004 -0.002  -0.002  0.000 0.000 -0.479  -0.004 
Yam  -0.002 -0.003 -0.003  -0.003 -0.001  0.000 0.000 -0.008  -0.414 
Other roots  -0.005  -0.002  -0.004  -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.008  -0.002 
Oil crops  -0.004  -0.005  -0.006  -0.004  -0.002  0.000 0.000 -0.013  -0.006 
Pulses -0.006  -0.003  -0.005  -0.003  -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.009  -0.003 
Other crops  -0.007  -0.005  -0.008  -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.017  -0.004 
Poultry -0.010  -0.011  -0.008  -0.006  -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.020  -0.006 
Other 
livestock -0.008  -0.006  -0.009  -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.015  -0.003 
Industry -0.005  -0.005  -0.006 -0.004 -0.002 0.000  -0.001 -0.015  -0.007 
Services -0.008  -0.008  -0.007  -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.015  -0.005 
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Table C.4. Continued 
  Other roots  Oil crops  Pulses  Other crops  Poultry Other  livestock  Industry  Services 
Maize -0.004  -0.004  -0.001  0.000 0.000  -0.005  -0.018  -0.021 
Rice -0.004  -0.011  -0.002  0.000 -0.001  -0.007  -0.038  -0.042 
Sorghum -0.003  -0.005  -0.001  0.000 0.000  -0.004  -0.019  -0.016 
Millet -0.002  -0.006  -0.001  0.000 0.000  -0.003  -0.023  -0.017 
Wheat -0.009  -0.009  -0.003  0.000 -0.001  -0.011  -0.036  -0.038 
Barley -0.008  -0.001  -0.003  0.000 0.000  -0.006  -0.008  -0.018 
Other cereals  -0.007  -0.002  -0.003  0.000 0.000  -0.006  -0.009  -0.018 
Cassava -0.003  -0.005  -0.001  0.000 0.000  -0.004  -0.023  -0.017 
Yam -0.002  -0.006  -0.001  0.000 0.000  -0.002  -0.024  -0.012 
Other roots  -0.426  -0.004  -0.002  0.000 0.000  -0.004  -0.017  -0.017 
Oil crops  -0.003  -0.645  -0.001  0.000 0.000  -0.005  -0.030  -0.024 
Pulses -0.005  -0.005  -0.508  0.000 0.000  -0.005  -0.021  -0.021 
Other crops  -0.006  -0.009  -0.002  -0.759 -0.001  -0.008  -0.031  -0.032 
Poultry -0.006 -0.013  -0.003  0.000 -1.242  -0.010  -0.053  -0.055 
Other livestock  -0.006  -0.009  -0.002 0.000  -0.001  -0.835  -0.032  -0.036 
Industry -0.004  -0.008  -0.002  0.000 -0.001  -0.005  -0.980  -0.029 
Services -0.005  -0.009  -0.002  0.000 -0.001  -0.008  -0.040  -0.983 
Source: Calculated based on consumption pattern and income elasticity. 
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Table C.5. Annual area expansion rate applied to the area coefficient in the model 
 Maize  Rice  Sorghum Millet Wheat  Barley Other 
cereals  Cassava Yam Other 
roots 
Oil 
crops  Pulses Other 
crops 
Angola 3.1  4.5  0.0  4.3  4.5  0.0  0.0  4.5  0.0  4.5  4.5  4.5  4.5 
Cameroon 1.7  4.4  1.7  1.7  4.4  0.0  0.0  1.7  1.7  1.7  4.4  1.7  1.7 
Ethiopia 1.7  4.4  1.7  1.7  4.4  1.7  1.7  0.0  1.7  1.7  4.4  1.7  2.5 
Ghana 1.7  4.4  1.7  1.7  0.0  0.0  1.7  1.7  1.7  1.7  4.4  1.7  2.6 
Kenya 1.7  4.5  1.7  1.7  4.5  1.7  1.7  1.7  1.7  1.7  4.5  1.7  1.7 
Liberia 0.0  4.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.7  1.7  1.7  1.7  4.4  1.7  2.7 
Madagascar 2.1  4.5  2.1 0.0  4.5  0.0  0.0  2.1  0.0  2.1  4.5  2.1  2.1 
Malawi 1.7  4.4  1.7  1.7  4.4  0.0  0.0  1.7  0.0  1.7  4.4  1.7  1.7 
Mali 2.3  4.5  2.3  2.3  4.5  0.0  2.3  2.3  2.3  2.3  4.5  2.3  2.3 
Mozambique 1.7  4.4  1.7  1.7  4.4  0.0  0.0  1.7 0.0  1.7  4.4  1.7  4.5 
Nigeria 1.7  4.4  1.7  1.7  4.4  0.0  1.7  1.7  1.7  1.7  4.4  1.7  3.6 
Rwanda 1.7  4.4  1.7  1.7  4.4  0.0  0.0  1.7  1.7  1.7  4.4  1.7  2.7 
Senegal 1.8  4.5  1.8  1.8  0.0  0.0  1.8  1.8  0.0  1.8  4.5  1.8  1.8 
Sierra Leone  3.2  4.5  3.2  3.2  0.0  0.0  3.2  3.2  0.0  3.2  4.5  3.2  3.2 
Tanzania 1.7  4.4  1.7  1.7  4.4  1.7  1.7  1.7  1.7  1.7  4.4  1.7  3.0 
Uganda 2.7  4.5  2.7  2.7  4.5  0.0  0.0  2.7  0.0  2.7  4.5  2.7  2.7 
Zambia 1.7  4.4  1.7  1.7  4.4  1.7  0.0  1.7  0.0  1.7  4.4  1.7  1.7 
Rest of East 
Africa 2.6  2.6  2.6  2.6  2.6  2.6  2.6  2.6  2.6  2.6  2.6  2.6  2.6 
Rest of Southern 
Africa 2.8  2.8  2.8  2.8  2.8  2.8  2.8  2.8  0.0  2.8  2.8  2.8  2.8 
Rest of West 
Africa 2.6  2.6  2.6  2.6  2.6  2.6  2.6  2.6  2.6  2.6  2.6  2.6  2.6 
Source: Calculated based on historical trends.  
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Table C.6. Annual growth rate applied to the yield coefficient in the model 
 Maize  Rice  Sorghum Millet Wheat  Barley  Other 
cereals  Cassava Yam Other 
roots 
Oil 
crops  Pulses  Other 
crops 
Angola 11.5  10.9  0.0  10.4  11.7  0.0  0.0  4.2  0.0  2.5  5.1  6.4  2.9 
Cameroon 10.2  7.7  11.1  11.1  14.0  0.0  0.0  16.1  16.1  9.6  11.3  3.1  2.2 
Ethiopia 9.8  10.3  11.3  11.3  14.2  11.3  11.3  0.0  12.7  12.7  13.2  7.4  2.2 
Ghana 13.3  12.2  10.7  10.7  0.0  0.0  10.7  11.0  9.9  8.3  10.0  14.3  2.2 
Kenya 14.1  9.2  13.1  13.1  14.2  13.1  13.1  13.7  13.7  11.0  10.9  11.5  2.2 
Liberia 0.0  2.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  11.3  13.4  13.4  10.8  3.7  8.1  2.2 
Madagascar 11.7  7.0  3.7  0.0  13.6 0.0 0.0  13.6 0.0  13.6  15.4  4.4  2.8 
Malawi 15.7  14.3  11.1  11.1  16.4  0.0  0.0  11.0  0.0  8.8  8.8  10.5  2.2 
Mali 16.8  12.3  8.9  8.9  11.5  0.0  8.9  10.2  10.2  8.2  8.0  11.1  3.0 
Mozambique 14.7  11.5  10.8  10.8  15.3  0.0  0.0  13.2  0.0  10.6  9.6 12.9  2.2 
Nigeria 15.3  14.7  11.9  11.9  14.1  0.0  11.9  13.5  10.6  10.6  13.5  13.4  2.2 
Rwanda 15.2  11.2  10.3  10.3  15.0  0.0  0.0  15.0  15.0  10.5  6.9  11.7  2.2 
Senegal 2.7  8.4  13.7  13.7  0.0  0.0  13.7  14.6  0.0  11.7  9.1  14.0  2.4 
Sierra  Leone 9.2  8.5  5.1  5.1  0.0  0.0  5.1  11.8  0.0  11.8  3.1 5.0  4.2 
Tanzania 12.8  12.3  10.5  10.5  16.0  10.5  10.5  13.3  12.0  13.3  14.2  13.6  2.2 
Uganda 11.6  12.0  11.0  11.0  14.9  0.0  0.0  14.2  0.0  9.9  10.3  11.8  3.5 
Zambia 10.1  10.2  8.8  8.8  7.0  8.8  0.0  13.4  0.0  10.7  10.2  12.1  2.2 
Rest of East 
Africa 1.4  1.4  1.4  1.4  1.4  1.4  1.4  1.4  1.4  1.4  1.4  1.4  1.4 
Rest of Southern 
Africa 1.1  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.1  0.0  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.1 
Rest of West 
Africa 1.3  1.3  1.3  1.3  1.3  1.3  1.3  1.3  1.3  1.3  1.3  1.3  1.3 
Source: Calculated based on growth potential  
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Table C.7. Crop area and annual growth rate as the model results 
      Angola        Cameroon        Ethiopia    
  Crop area (1,000 ha)  Annual growth  Crop area (1,000 ha)  Annual growth  Crop area (1,000 ha)  Annual growth 
   Current  By 2013  rate (%)  Current  By 2013  rate (%)  Current  By 2013  rate (%) 
Maize 1,333  1,448  1.7  534  548 0.5  2,733  2,779  0.3 
Rice 5  6 5.5  18  24  6.2  11  15  5.3 
Sorghum       414 425  0.5  2,240  2,270 0.3 
Millet 342  393  2.8  45  47  0.7  540  556  0.6 
Wheat 3  4  5.5  0 0  6.2  2,261  2,742  3.9 
Barley             1,881  1,913  0.3 
Other cereals              5,205  5,211  0.0 
Cassava 898 1,081  3.8  387  389  0.1       
Yam      38  39 0.5  56  57  0.3 
Other roots  273  338  4.4  304  314  0.6  917  934  0.4 
Oil crops  1,325  1,639  4.3  4,099  4,763  3.0  4,177  4,986  3.6 
Pulses 472  617  5.5  283  319 2.5  2,076  2,262  1.7 
Other crops  22  28  5.0  11  12  3.1  28  33  3.8 
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Table C.7. Continued 
   Ghana     Kenya     Liberia   
  Crop area (1,000 ha)  Annual growth  Crop area (1,000 ha)  Annual growth  Crop area (1,000 ha)  Annual growth 
   Current  By 2013  rate (%)  Current  By 2013  rate (%)  Current  By 2013  rate (%) 
Maize 741  784  1.1  2,262  2,194  -0.6       
Rice  142  192  6.3 17  22  5.7 142  184  5.2 
Sorghum  228 237  0.8  265 278  1.0       
Millet  234 245  0.9  119 122  0.5       
Wheat       149  195  5.6      
Barley       15  15  0.1      
Other  cereals  0 0  0.8  4 4  0.1  1 1  -0.2 
Cassava 770 789  0.5  31  31  -0.1  101 96  -1.0 
Yam  328  339  0.7  1 1  -0.2  3 3  -0.7 
Other  roots  316 336  1.2  149 151  0.3  7  7  0.0 
Oil  crops  5,153  6,084  3.4 681  812  3.6 225  275  4.1 
Pulses  180  191  1.2 1,460  1,524  0.9 7  8  2.5 
Other  crops  243  297  4.1 44  51  2.9 2  2  3.3 
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      Madagascar     Malawi        Mali    
  Crop area (1,000 ha)  Annual growth  Crop area (1,000 ha)  Annual growth  Crop area (1,000 ha)  Annual growth 
   Current  By 2013  rate (%)  Current  By 2013  rate (%)  Current  By 2013  rate (%) 
Maize  164 170  0.7  1,112  1,097  -0.3  634 658  0.8 
Rice  1,372  1,758  5.1 43  52  4.0 594  705  3.5 
Sorghum  2  2  2.3 64  70  1.9 947  1,014  1.4 
Millet       38  40 1.1  1,722  1,836  1.3 
Wheat  4 6  5.1  2 3  6.6  2 2  5.7 
Barley                
Other  cereals            38  41  1.2 
Cassava 345 342  -0.2  127 131  0.6  3  3  1.4 
Yam           2  2 1.0 
Other  roots  183 182  -0.1  151 157  0.9  13  14  1.6 
Oil  crops  476 535  2.4  628 764  4.0  5,709  6,906  3.9 
Pulses  81  92  2.4 511  545  1.3 337  360  1.4 
Other  crops  7 8  3.0  9 11 3.2  17  21 3.4  
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Table C.7. Continued 
      Mozambique     Nigeria        Rwanda    
  Crop area (1,000 ha)  Annual growth  Crop area (1,000 ha)  Annual growth  Crop area (1,000 ha)  Annual growth 
   Current  By 2013  rate (%)  Current  By 2013  rate (%)  Current  By 2013  rate (%) 
Maize  1,281 1,308  0.4  5,567 5,848  1.0  127  134  1.1 
Rice  175  238  6.3 3,730  4,766  5.0 16  20  4.5 
Sorghum  482  512  1.2 8,086  8,505  1.0 250  258  0.7 
Millet  75  80  1.2 6,959  7,222  0.7 5  5  1.1 
Wheat  1  1  6.4 57  78  6.6 27  33  3.9 
B a r l e y                 
Other  cereals       188  198  1.1      
Cassava  1,909 1,887  -0.2  4,483 4,576  0.4  137  139  0.4 
Yam      3,972  4,135  0.8  2  2 0.9 
Other  roots  17  18  1.1 1,795  1,890  1.0 357  359  0.1 
Oil  crops  2,692  3,299  4.2 41,109  49,149  3.6 189  236  4.6 
Pulses  430  456  1.2 6,604  6,939  1.0 357  378  1.2 
Other  crops  9  12  6.0 153  198  5.2 8  10  4.2 
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Table C.7. Continued 
      Senegal        Sierra Leone     Tanzania    
  Crop area (1,000 ha)  Annual growth  Crop area (1,000 ha)  Annual growth  Crop area (1,000 ha)  Annual growth 
   Current  By 2013  rate (%)  Current  By 2013  rate (%)  Current  By 2013  rate (%) 
Maize  147  169  2.8 39  43  2.1 2,036  2,004  -0.3 
Rice  113 147  5.5  585 733  4.6  500 618  4.4 
Sorghum  186  189  0.4 13  15  2.6 779  809  0.8 
Millet 1,291  1,285  -0.1  20  23 2.7  191  200  1.0 
Wheat            107  144  6.1 
Barley            2  2 2.7 
Other  cereals  3 3  0.1  3 3  2.4  18  19 0.6 
Cassava  42 41  -0.3  75 78  0.9  671  673 0.1 
Yam           2  2 0.4 
Other  roots  2  2  0.3 12  12  1.0 572  588  0.6 
Oil  crops  3,171  3,731  3.3 403  505  4.6 6,279  7,461  3.5 
Pulses  1,432  1,465  0.5 85  99  3.2 810  847  0.9 
Other  crops  25  29  3.0 1  2  3.6 29  36  4.4 
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Table C.7. Continued 
      Uganda        Zambia    
  Crop area (1,000 ha)  Annual growth  Crop area (1,000 ha)  Annual growth 
   Current  By 2013  rate (%)  Current  By 2013  rate (%) 
Maize  650 703  1.6  450 462  0.5 
Rice 102  133  5.6  11  15  5.5 
Sorghum 305  339  2.2  31  35  2.7 
Millet 396  428  1.6  45  47 0.9 
Wheat 9 12 6.5  21  28 5.5 
Barley       2  2  0.6 
Other  cereals           
Cassava 413 430  0.8  155 152  -0.4 
Yam          
Other roots  678  731  1.5  6  6  0.3 
Oil  crops  3,968 4,788  3.8  1,330 1,562  3.3 
Pulses 909  1,005  2.0  32  37 2.7 
Other crops  39  47  4.0  7  8  2.8 
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Table C.7. Continued 
      Rest of E. Africa     Rest of S. Africa     Rest of W. Africa 
  Crop area (1,000 ha)  Annual growth  Crop area (1,000 ha)  Annual growth  Crop area (1,000 ha)  Annual growth 
   Current  By 2013  rate (%)  Current  By 2013  rate (%)  Current  By 2013  rate (%) 
Maize  2,569 2,927  2.6  2,049 2,361  2.9  3,402 3,840  2.5 
Rice  630  719  2.7 0  0  2.9 1,363  1,558  2.7 
Sorghum  14,598  16,464  2.4 172  198  2.9 6,314  7,106  2.4 
Millet  5,844  6,627  2.5 284  322  2.5 8,926  10,043  2.4 
Wheat  257  293  2.7 52  60  2.9 13  15  2.8 
Barley  60  69  2.7 7  8  2.9 1  1  2.8 
Other  cereals  13  14  2.2 4  5  2.4 1,316  1,474  2.3 
Cassava  2,642  2,951  2.2 47  54  2.5 1,321  1,488  2.4 
Yam  110 122  2.2        851 952  2.3 
Other  roots  312 348  2.2  259 292  2.5  251 282  2.3 
Oil  crops  15,999  18,100  2.5 3,779  4,353  2.9 21,159  24,076  2.6 
Pulses  1,162  1,328  2.7 123  141  2.9 5,830  6,618  2.6 
Other  crops  93 106 2.6  15 17  2.8  196  224 2.7 
Source: Model simulation results.  
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Table C.8. Crop yield and annual growth rate as the model results 
      Angola        Cameroon        Ethiopia    
  Level of yield (mt/ha)  Annual growth  Level of yield (mt/ha)  Annual growth  Level of yield (mt/ha)  Annual growth 
   Current  By 2013  rate (%)  Current  By 2013  rate (%)  Current  By 2013  rate (%) 
Maize  0.5  0.8  9.3 1.9  2.8  7.7 1.9  2.8  7.8 
Rice  1.8 3.0  10.9  2.9  4.3  7.7  1.9 2.9  9.6 
Sorghum       1.3  1.9  8.2  1.3  2.0  8.5 
Millet  0.4  0.6  7.9 1.1  1.7  8.2 1.0  1.5  8.4 
Wheat  1.7  2.9  11.7 1.3  2.6  14.0 1.4  2.5  12.7 
Barley            1.0  1.5  8.4 
Other  cereals  0.0  0.5   0.0  1.6   0.8  1.2  8.4 
Cassava 9.6  11.0  2.9  5.5 9.7  12.0       
Yam       7.7  13.7  12.3  4.2  6.4  9.0 
Other  roots  3.5  3.8  1.5 4.9  6.9  6.8 8.2  13.1  9.7 
Oil  crops  0.4  0.4  4.0 0.6  0.9  8.8 0.2  0.3  10.6 
Pulses  0.2  0.3  6.4 1.1  1.2  2.2 0.9  1.2  5.9 
Other  crops  0.2  0.3  2.5 1.1  1.2  1.7 0.9  1.0  1.9 
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Table C.8. Continued 
      Ghana        Kenya        Liberia    
  Level of yield (mt/ha)  Annual growth  Level of yield (mt/ha)  Annual growth  Level of yield (mt/ha)  Annual growth 
   Current  By 2013  rate (%)  Current  By 2013  rate (%)  Current  By 2013  rate (%) 
Maize  1.6 2.7  11.1  1.3 2.2  11.6       
Rice  2.0 3.6  12.2  3.7 5.8  9.2  0.9 1.0  2.2 
Sorghum  1.3 2.0  7.9  0.6 1.0  11.1       
Millet  0.8 1.2  8.0  0.4 0.7  10.5       
Wheat       2.5  4.8  14.2      
Barley       2.7  4.4  10.2      
Other  cereals  0.7 1.0  7.8  1.0 1.7  10.2  0.9 1.4  8.4 
Cassava 12.4 18.2  7.9  11.1 17.9  10.0  6.5  10.5  10.0 
Yam  12.5  17.4 6.8  8.4 13.5 10.0  8.7 13.8 9.8 
Other  roots  5.6 7.5  6.0  8.2 12.3 8.3  9.1 13.4 8.1 
Oil  crops  0.6 0.9  7.6  0.3 0.5  8.8  1.3 1.5  2.8 
Pulses  0.1 0.1  11.7  0.4 0.6  9.5  0.6 0.9  8.1 
Other  crops  0.1 0.1  1.8  0.4 0.4  2.3  0.6 0.7  2.1 
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Table C.8. Continued 
      Madagascar     Malawi        Mali    
  Level of yield (mt/ha)  Annual growth  Level of yield (mt/ha)  Annual growth  Level of yield (mt/ha)  Annual growth 
   Current  By 2013  rate (%)  Current  By 2013  rate (%)  Current  By 2013  rate (%) 
Maize  1.8 2.8  9.5  1.1 2.1  13.0  1.0 1.9  14.2 
Rice  2.5 3.4  6.5  1.2 2.0  11.7  1.6 2.7  11.0 
Sorghum  0.5 0.6  3.3  0.6 1.0  9.1  0.7 0.9  6.9 
Millet  2.4 4.5  13.6  0.5 0.7  8.2  0.7 0.9  7.0 
Wheat        0.8 1.6  16.4  3.0 5.1  11.5 
B a r l e y                 
Other  cereals  0.0 2.4    0.0 1.1    0.7 1.0  6.5 
Cassava  6.2 10.2 10.4  16.3  23.4 7.5  17.9  25.7 7.5 
Yam            20.6  29.1  7.2 
Other roots  5.5  9.1  10.6  11.9  16.1  6.1  16.5  22.3  6.2 
Oil  crops  0.4 0.8  12.4  0.4 0.6  6.4  0.3 0.4  6.4 
Pulses  1.0 1.2  4.1  0.5 0.7  8.0  0.3 0.5  8.8 
Other  crops  1.0 1.2  3.0  0.5 0.5  1.6  0.3 0.4  3.0 
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Table C.8. Continued 
      Mozambique     Nigeria        Rwanda    
  Level of yield (mt/ha)  Annual growth  Level of yield (mt/ha)  Annual growth  Level of yield (mt/ha)  Annual growth 
   Current  By 2013  rate (%)  Current  By 2013  rate (%)  Current  By 2013  rate (%) 
Maize  1.1 1.9  12.1  1.1 1.9  12.6  0.8 1.4  12.6 
Rice  1.0 1.7  11.5  1.0 1.8  13.5  3.8 6.0  9.4 
Sorghum  0.6 1.0  8.3  1.1 1.8  9.4  0.9 1.3  7.6 
Millet  0.5 0.7  8.2  1.0 1.6  9.0  0.8 1.1  7.5 
Wheat  1.1 2.3  15.3  1.2 2.3  14.1  0.8 1.4  12.3 
B a r l e y                 
Other  cereals  0.0 0.9    0.5 0.8  9.0  0.0 1.0   
Cassava  6.0 9.6  9.9  9.3 14.7 9.6  5.7 9.6  11.0 
Yam        8.6 12.2 7.3  2.7 4.6  11.3 
Other  roots  9.3 13.5 7.9  5.0 7.3  7.8  6.5 9.5  7.7 
Oil  crops  0.2 0.4  7.4  0.5 0.8  10.9  0.2 0.3  5.0 
Pulses  0.5 0.8  10.4  0.4 0.7  10.4  0.6 0.9  9.2 
Other  crops  0.5 0.5  1.7  0.4 0.5  1.7  0.6 0.7  1.7 
  
  52
Table C.8. Continued 
      Senegal        Sierra Leone        Tanzania    
  Level of yield (mt/ha)  Annual growth  Level of yield (mt/ha)  Annual growth  Level of yield (mt/ha)  Annual growth 
   Current  By 2013  rate (%)  Current  By 2013  rate (%)  Current  By 2013  rate (%) 
Maize 2.7  3.1 2.7  1.0  1.5  8.0  1.6  2.6 10.3 
Rice 2.5  3.7  8.4  1.3  1.9  8.5  1.9  3.2  11.1 
Sorghum 0.8  1.3  11.1  1.1 1.3  4.4  1.1  1.7  8.0 
Millet 0.5  0.8 10.8  1.0  1.2  4.5  0.8  1.2 8.0 
Wheat             1.1  2.3  16.0 
Barley             2.3  3.6  9.8 
Other cereals  0.4  0.7  10.8  1.1  1.4  4.2  0.8  1.2  7.6 
Cassava 6.7  11.3  10.9  5.2  8.1  9.3  10.4  16.6  9.7 
Yam             6.5  9.7  8.4 
Other roots  21.9  33.6  9.0  2.4  3.8  9.3  2.3  3.7  10.4 
Oil crops  0.5  0.7  7.4  1.0  1.2  3.1  0.2  0.3  11.6 
Pulses 0.1  0.1 11.4  0.7  0.9  4.8  0.6  1.0  11.0 
Other crops  0.1  0.1  2.7  0.7  0.9  4.5  0.6  0.7  1.9 
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Table C.8. Continued 
      Uganda        Zambia          
  Level of yield (mt/ha)  Annual growth  Level of yield (mt/ha)  Annual growth       
   Current  By 2013  rate (%)  Current  By 2013  rate (%)       
Maize  1.8 2.8  9.0  1.9 2.9  8.3       
Rice  1.5 2.6  11.2  1.2 1.9  10.2       
Sorghum  1.5 2.2  8.6  0.6 0.9  8.8       
Millet  1.7 2.5  8.1  0.7 0.9  6.9       
Wheat  1.7 3.3  14.9  6.4 9.0  7.0       
Barley        0.9  1.3  6.6     
Other  cereals  0.0 1.7    0.0 1.9         
Cassava  13.5  21.9  10.2  5.8  9.3  9.9     
Yam                 
Other  roots  4.7  6.6  7.1 13.3  19.7  8.2      
Oil  crops  0.3 0.4  7.9  0.2 0.3  8.1       
Pulses  0.7 1.1  9.2  0.5 0.9  12.1       
Other  crops  0.7 0.8  3.0  0.5 0.6  2.3       
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Table C.8. Continued 
      Rest of E. Africa     Rest of S. Africa     Rest of W. Africa 
  Level of yield (mt/ha)  Annual growth  Level of yield (mt/ha)  Annual growth  Level of yield (mt/ha)  Annual growth 
   Current  By 2013  rate (%)  Current  By 2013  rate (%)  Current  By 2013  rate (%) 
Maize  0.8 0.9  1.4  0.5 0.6  1.1  1.1 1.1  1.1 
Rice  0.9 1.0  1.4  2.6 2.7  1.1  1.9 2.1  1.3 
Sorghum  0.4 0.5  1.2  0.7 0.7  1.1  0.6 0.6  1.0 
Millet  0.2 0.2  1.2  0.3 0.3  0.8  0.5 0.5  1.0 
Wheat  2.3 2.5  1.4  3.0 3.1  1.1  1.0 1.1  1.3 
Barley  0.2 0.2  1.4  4.3 4.6  1.1  2.0 2.1  1.3 
Other  cereals  0.8 0.9  0.9  0.8 0.9  0.6  0.5 0.5  0.9 
Cassava  8.1 8.5  1.0  4.4 4.5  0.7  6.8 7.1  0.9 
Yam 3.0  3.1  0.8        10.2  10.7  0.8 
Other  roots  8.2 8.6  0.9  2.3 2.4  0.7  5.0 5.3  0.9 
Oil  crops  0.3 0.4  1.2  0.2 0.3  1.1  0.5 0.5  1.2 
Pulses  0.8 0.9  1.4  0.7 0.7  1.1  0.3 0.3  1.1 
Other  crops  0.8 0.9  1.3  0.7 0.7  1.0  0.3 0.3  1.3 
Source: Model simulation results. 
Note: mt = metric ton.  
 
Table C.9. Sensitivity test: Total change in producer prices (% change from the base, averaged over 
17 countries, 2008–2013)  
   Testing alternative supply elasticities  Testing alternative income elasticities 
   50% lower  Simulation 1  50% higher  25% lower  Simulation 1  25% higher 
Maize  -34.9  -33.2 -29.9 -35.1  -33.2 -27.0 
Rice  -12.5  -12.1 -11.2 -20.1  -12.1 -5.1 
Sorghum  -30.2  -29.1 -27.1 -31.2  -29.1 -23.8 
Millet  -34.0  -32.8 -28.9 -34.7  -32.8 -25.5 
Wheat  -20.3  -19.5 -17.9 -28.3  -19.5 -5.7 
Barley  -47.3  -47.3 -44.3 -47.3  -47.3 -37.6 
Other  cereal  -43.4  -43.4 -39.5 -43.4  -43.4 -33.9 
Cassava  -37.4  -34.5 -29.9 -37.7  -34.5 -27.6 
Yams  -41.1  -38.7 -33.8 -41.1  -38.7 -32.1 
Other  roots  -43.3  -42.3 -38.4 -43.4  -42.3 -33.8 
Oil  crops -29.7  -29.0 -27.9 -32.0  -29.0 -24.2 
Pulses  -31.0  -30.3 -28.0 -34.0  -30.3 -21.9 
Other  crops  -3.8  -6.1 -6.3 -14.7  -6.1 4.4 
Poultry  -4.2  -5.9 -6.2 -13.2  -5.9 0.6 




-0.49   2.34  -3.94   7.95 
Source: Model simulation results. 
Note: Simulation 1 is the simulation without market integration.  
 
Table C.10. Current level of public spending on agriculture and national poverty rate 
  
Current public spending on 
agriculture in constant 2008 $US 
million 
Share in total spending (%) 
 
Headcount poverty 
rate in 2007 (%) 
Angola n/a    52.0 
Cameroon 107  3.8  28.7 
Ethiopia 360  13.6  38.9 
Ghana 119  6.7  28.2 
Kenya 174  4.2  61.3 
Liberia n/a    28.7 
Madagascar 9  1.6  87.7 
Malawi 22  2.7  64.6 
Mali 205  14.5  61.2 
Mozambique 66  4.0  41.7 
Nigeria 934  3.2  77.4 
Rwanda 21  4.0  67.2 
Senegal 88  4.4  57.2 
Sierra Leone  8  3.1  77.4 
Tanzania 115  4.4  37.9 
Uganda 99  5.0  29.4 
Zambia 44  2.7  66.1 
Rest of E. Africa  9  3.0  52.0 
Rest of S. Africa  161  4.3  30.0 
Rest of W. Africa  646  6.7  30.0 
Source: Government finance statistics of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), supplemented by statistical appendix and 
poverty reduction strategy papers. The definition of agricultural expenditure is the standard definition used by the IMF in the 
GFS Manual (2001). Public spending on agriculture and total spending are updated to 2007 at 2008 U.S. dollars using historical 
trends. Poverty rates are also updated using trends.   
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